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INTRODUCTION 
In recent years, the international system has suffered from the influence 
of two powerful, and perhaps related, forces, one centripetal and the other 
centrifugal. The most notable example of the centripetal forces is that 
European countries have placed themselves on the path towards broader 
economic, and perhaps political, unification, which according to some will 
involve the construction of a new legal order comparable to the federation of 
the United States. 1 At the same time, the United States is extending its own 
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author's presentation to the law faculty of comparative perspectives on federalism and 
autonomy and, therefore, reflects an initial effort to explain threshold similarities and 
differences between the two doctrines in the context of issues of concern to 
international lawyers. I especially thank Professors Gloria Moran Garcia and F. Javier 
Sanz Larruga for their support during my sabbatical visit to Spain, and I would like 
to acknowledge the courteous invitation of the editor of this journal, Dr. Romualdo 
Bermejo Garcia, to submit this article - which I hope may help add to the under-
standing among U.S. and Spanish international lawyers of the role their respective 
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Spanish quotes are translated into English for English only readers, but the original 
Spanish version is made available in each case in the footnotes. 
1. See Manfred ZULEEG: What Holds A Nation Together?: Cohesion and 
Democracy in the United States of America and in the European Union, 45 AM. 
J. COMP. L. 505 (Summer 1997); Ernst BENDA: The Impact of Supranational 
Institutions on Constitutional Law and Doctrine. The European Experience, 42 ST. 
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sphere of free trade to include all of North America through NAFTA and, if 
President Bush were to have his wishes, to include all commerce throughout 
the Americas from Alaska to Tierra del Fiego. 2 In addition, the proliferation 
of bilateral treaties protecting investment has supported the phenomenon 
of regional free trade pacts. 3 One has to acknowledge, nonetheless, that 
these measures toward economic integration have developed under a new 
international economic regime created by the World Trade Organization 
(WTO) and a new international political and security regime established after 
the termination of the Cold War with the resurgence of the authority of the 
Security Council of the United Nations (UN) - although both of these new 
realities have been placed in doubt in recent years with the failure of the 
WTO's Seattle Ministerial and with the disagreement between the United 
States and Russia over Kosovo which precluded advance Security 
Council authorization for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 
intervention. Setting these doubts aside, there is no question that international 
peace and security during the last decade has enabled the international 
community now to emphasize institution building to increase economic 
commerce and competition throughout the vast majority of states and most of 
all in the United States and European Union (EU). 
In the United States, as much as in the Member States of the European 
Union, these centripetal forces have been accompanied by the internal 
transfer of competence over many of these subject matters; in the case of the 
United States, from the states to the federal government and, in the case of the 
European Union, from the regions to the State Members and from the 
State Members to the European Community, and it was precisely these 
competences that in the past were considered powers of the state or the 
substate entity rather than the supranational or treaty community. The 
comparison between the U.S. and EU is not exact; nonetheless, both have 
suffered from internal tension caused by the centralization of authority and in 
Louis U.L.J. 521 (Spring 1998); Rudolf DOLZER: Subsidiarity: Toward a New 
Balance Among the European Community and the Member States?, 4 2 ST. LOUIS 
U.L.J. 521 (Spring 1998). This literature originates in the seminal work of Eric STEIN; 
Lawyers, Judges, and the Making of a Transnational Constitution, 7 5 AM. J. I N T ' L L . 
1 (1981); J .H.H. WEILER: The Transformation of Europe, 100 YALE L. J. 2403 (1991); 
and George A. Bermann, Taking Subsidiarity Seriously: Federalism in the European 
Community and the United States, 9 4 COLUM. L. REV. 3 3 1 (1994). 
2. See "Trade in the Americas", The Economist, April 2 1 , 2 0 0 1 , 19-22. 
3. See Kenneth VANDEVELDE: "U.S. Bilateral Investment Treaties: The Second 
Wave," 1 4 MICH. J. I N T ' L L . 621 (1993). 
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both systems the sub-state entities have launched a counterattack against the 
centripetal forces which, together with anti-globalization ideology, constitute 
a new centrifugal force in the international system. At least it is possible to 
argue that in both systems the growth of theories supporting centrifugal 
tendencies in the relationship between the central state and sub-state entities, 
especially in relation to the external activities of sub-state entities, has been 
related to the widening and deepening of the international economic 
communities in which both the U.S. and EU participate. It is possible that, as 
predicted by theory of law and economics, given that sub-state entities can 
now more readily obtain the benefits of free trade and international security 
through supranational and international organizations, it has become more 
efficient to permit decentralization of non-economic authority so that the 
advantages of local governance can be exploited by transferring authority 
from the center to the periphery, suggesting that the optimal size of states has 
reduced through economic integration.4 
This article will focus on a narrow aspect of the larger question of the 
effect of international economic integration and increased international 
security on the national legal order of complex states, such as the United 
States and Spain. At first glance, the United States and Spain have rather 
different systems of constitutional law concerning the relationship between 
the center and periphery. Nonetheless, as this article will argue, it is revealing 
to explore the recent responses of theories as different as U.S. federalism 
and Spain's system of autonomous communities to the new international 
environment in the crucial area of the external activities of sub-state entities. 
In this way, one can begin to understand the extent to which centripetal and 
centrifugal forces described above may influence constitutional systems 
generally. 
This article therefore will begin with a comparison of common law and 
the continental system of legal science, which in each constitutional system 
operate as a lens through which one can study the substance of constitutional 
and international law (and, in the case of Spain, also supranational law). 
These conceptual lenses are necessary for readers or students of both systems 
to translate the opinions of the U.S. Supreme Court and Spain's Constitutional 
4. See Alberto ALESINA & Enrico SPOLAORE: On the Number and Size of Nations 
(National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No. 5050, 1995) (suggesting 
that the principal benefit of the size of a state is its ability to produce public goods, 
such as free trade, and that when these goods are produced by means of international 
or supranational law the optimal size of a state should decrease. 
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Tribunal into their respective legal vocabularies. Once these concepts are 
explicated, it will be possible to analyze the similarities and differences 
between federalism's organizing concept of dual sovereignty and Spanish 
autonomy's organizing concept, in my view, of a version of subsidiarity. 
Thereafter, this article will apply these concepts to the jurisprudence of 
the U.S. Supreme Court and Spain's Constitutional Tribunal concerning 
the external activities of sub-state entities, and then it will conclude with 
some brief comments concerning the significance of these constitutional 
developments for the state of international law and the comparative study of 
constitutional law, in particular the relative value of constitutional law 
methodologies grounded in common law and civil law in responding to 
international system change. 
I. AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL COMMON LAW AND SPANISH 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AS SCIENTIFIC DOCTRINE 
It is difficult to understand the opinions of tribunals when one does not 
know the methodological and philosophical premises upon which they are 
based. Therefore, I will attempt in this section to explicate the assumptions of 
the U.S. system and, as much as I can having been "trained" in Anglo-
American law, the continental, system. 
A. The Case-law Method and U.S. Constitutional Law 
It is appropriate to say "trained" in the Anglo-American system because, 
according to Richard Posner, the famous judge of the U.S. Federal Court of 
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, and founder of the Law & Economics 
approach while a professor at the University of Chicago, the relation between 
American law teachers and their students is very much like the relationship 
between a coach or "trainer" of a team sport and the members of the team 5 . 
5. See Richard A. POSNER: THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 99, n. 49 (1990). 
Posner achieved fame for his studies concerning how common law rules could be 
explained by means of economic science. And he advocated the judicial use of 
economic concepts to formulate opinions and legislative use of economic analysis to 
write statutes. See generally Richard A. POSNER: Introduction to Law and Economics 
(4th ed. 1992). 
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From this one can deduce that North American legal method is, more than 
anything else, anti-theoretical and pragmatic, as much in its teaching as in its 
conceptualization. This concept of law is rooted in U.S. historical experience 
in which judges produced the vast majority of legal rules and manifests itself 
in modern times through the revolution in the theory of American law 
effected in the first decades of the 20th century by the school of "Legal 
Realism"(which, by the way, has nothing to do with philosophical "Realism" 
of the Middle Ages, but rather finds its roots in Realism's rival, philosophical 
Nominalism, insofar as Legal Realism maintains that no system of rules 
exists a priori and, rather, that judges and other legislators create rules 
through their decisions). 
As to the historic function of the judge, it is important to begin our 
analysis with the fundamental point that judges suffer from limited 
democratic legitimacy. Accordingly, in the Anglo-American system, judges 
needed to maintain the illusion that in deciding concrete cases they were not 
creating new rules but were rather "finding" them in a pre-established system 
of rules. And what constitutes this system of rules? Not in the doctrine of 
professors, nor even the doctrine articulated in judicial opinions, but rather in 
precisely what these opinions hold. The concept through which this idea is 
expressed, the holding, consists in the ratio decidendi of the opinion. This 
means that at the moment an opinion is issued, one really does not know what 
it means. What a case holds is not just the reasons the judge gives for the 
judgment, nor the facts of the case. Rather, it is the conjunction of the reasons 
and the facts. But as we all know, among all the rationales and facts included 
in a judicial opinion it is difficult to know which of these reasons and facts 
were by the judge (or by the multiple judges writing opinions that together 
form a majority) deemed logically necessary to explain the judgment; this is 
especially true when judges do not make clear which facts are controlling and 
when they utilize multiple formulas in describing both the facts and the 
rationales at various levels of generality and abstraction, thus placing in doubt 
which of these various levels functions as the holding of the opinion. 
Furthermore, doubt over the holding of a case is exacerbated when judges 
produce a series of opinions on a particular question, which results in a 
chain of holdings. Insofar as doubt as to the meaning of each link in that chain 
complicates the task of interpreting the other links, the shape of chain as a 
whole is questionable, which in turn further complicates the task of 
interpreting individual precedents, although a kind of interpretive equilibrium 
might be achievable in many cases. 
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Some even argue that, because what is considered a "precedent" is 
neither more nor less than what a case holds, one can say that strictu sensu 
there are no precedents, because every new case has some factual difference 
from the supposed line of precedents. 6 Taking this approach, it is thought that 
judges and legislators, as well as lawyers who advocate for their clients 
before judges and legislators, in reality must resolve legal doubts by means of 
making two types of arguments and decisions: first, they must establish a 
hierarchy of policies relevant to the decision, including ironically taking into 
account the policy relating to the functioning of the legal system of the impact 
a decision will have as a precedent on the policies involved; second, they 
must analyze the effectiveness of each possible holding in advancing the 
relevant policies. 7 Accordingly, American law professors, whether from 
the neo-Marxist school of "critical legal studies" or the allegedly right-wing 
school of "law & economics," agree that what a case, and even a line of 
cases, holds cannot be explicated through a scientific method that would be 
capable of giving one and only one determinate solution to fact patterns that 
present themselves before judges. 8 
How does this conception of American case law affect the development 
of the work of the Supreme Court of the United States? The place to begin is 
that the very jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, as well as the rationale for its 
power to declare unconstitutional federal statutes and other governmental 
acts, is based on case law methodology. The justification advanced in the 
seminal case of Marbury v. Madison for the Supreme Court's assertion of the 
power of constitutional control was precisely that the United States had 
established a written constitution expressing the will of the people and that 
federal judges, in deciding concrete cases, were merely performing the 
6. See Kenneth J. VANDEVELDE: Thinking Like a Lawyer: An Introduction to 
Legal Reasoning 25-108 (1996). 
7. See ibid., 74. 
8. See POSNER: op. cit., 130 (law & economics); Duncan Kennedy, one of the 
fathers of critical legai studies is quoted in promotional materials for Vandevelde's 
book as saying, "Part I of this book contains the best introduction to legal reasoning 
that I know of." The most famous author taking a contrary position, Ronald Dworkin, 
is widely considered to argue that law functions as a kind of moral philosophy and that 
the judge, whom he metaphorically names Hercules, can analyze all the elements of 
the legal system to reach a single solution to any particular problem. See generally 
TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1977) and LAW'S EMPIRE (1986). Undoubtedly, 
Dworkin's position reflects the minority view, not only among professors but 
even more so among practitioners, judges as well as lawyers. Hercules remains a 
mythological figure in the law of the United States. 
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function of deciding those cases on the basis of the law expressing the will of 
the people, including of necessity higher-order law applicable to those 
concrete case. 9 More critically, the use of common-law methodology in 
performing this function was grounded in the specific textual basis found in 
Article III of the Constitution, which established clearly that the federal 
judicial power extended only to actual "cases ." 1 0 This reference to "cases" as 
the implicit limit of the function of constitutional control of the Supreme and 
lower federal courts led to the critical decision of the first Chief Justice, 1 1 
John Jay, and his fellow justices of the Supreme Court in 1793 to reject the 
request of the first president of the United States, George Washington, for an 
advisory opinion concerning certain questions of public international law 
emerging out of the French Revolutionary Wars, thus establishing a precedent 
that federal judicial power did not extend to abstract questions but rather was 
limited to issues where judicial power in itself was capable of giving a 
remedy or changing a legal relation. 1 2 Thus, the textual basis for the Supreme 
Court's jurisdiction and constitutional function was understood in Marbury v. 
Madison to make clear that constitutional decision-making by the Court was 
similar to common-law decision-making of ordinary courts. Accordingly, the 
Court's work risked the same uncertainty, but benefited from the same 
capacity for evolution, as did the common law. 
Indeed, one can speak of a "constitutional common law," not only in the 
content of constitutional law but also in the very method of constitutional 
adjudication. In one sense, the Supreme Court is widely believed to be 
mandated to create new constitutional law by means of a generous 
interpretation of prior precedents, and this conception has played a major role 
in the development of the Supreme Court's jurisprudence for the protection of 
9. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
10. Constitution of the U.S., Article III, section. 2 ("the judicial Power shall 
extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws 
of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their 
Authority...."). 
11 . In U.S. practice, the officers of inferior courts are referred to as "judges," 
while the judges of the Supreme Court are referred to as "the Justices," and the 
presiding officer of the Supreme Court, referred to as the "Chief Justice," is selected 
by the president of the United States with the advice and consent of the Senate rather 
than, as in Spain, by a vote of the other justices. See Vicki C. Jackson & Mark 
Tushnet, COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 488-98 (1999). 
12. See Lawrence H. TRIBE: American Constitutional Law 328 (3rd ed. 2000)(the 
so-called "Correspondences of the Justices," Letter of John Jay to George Washington, 
August 8, 1793)). 
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human rights, reaching even the point of the Supreme Court's describing 
itself as the "ultimate interpreter" of the Constitution. 1 3 But in another sense, 
this concept can justify a more restrained approach. Accordingly, various U.S. 
law professors have advanced the argument that the most appropriate 
approach for the Supreme Court is to resolve concrete cases by saying the 
least possible, a view rooted in Chief Justice John Marshall's distinction in 
Marbury between legal and political questions. 1 4 
Related factors also contribute to a culture of restrained constitutional 
adjudication by the Supreme Court and the lower federal courts. The fact that 
the justices of the Supreme Court are divided in the vast majority of cases, 
and these divisions are well known to the public, highlights the contestability 
of the premises of their constitutional reasoning. Furthermore, the discretion 
exercised by the justices as to the selection of the cases they will decide 
permits them to avoid legal issues that in reality require further development 
of public opinion before judicial pronouncements would receive public 
acceptance. Indeed, without breaching the constitution, such questions, as 
much as possible, can be decided by means of political competition in the 
democratic process. This restrained conception of the U.S. Supreme Court's 
method of constitutional control thus performs a democratizing function that 
leaves as many issues as possible open to resolution through the expression of 
the will of the American people. 
Nonetheless, it is undeniable that, when the moment that political 
development and legal doctrine coincide arrives, the Supreme Court has the 
capacity, through the common-law method, to re-read its constitutional 
precedents and to find in them new holdings. The common-law method 
13. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958)(involving the decision of one state of 
the United States to refuse to follow a precedent of the U.S. Supreme Court in which 
the Court had declared unconstitutional racial desegregation in state public schools). 
14. See Alexander BICKEL: The Least Dangerous Branch (1962)(arguing for 
methods through which the Supreme Court could avoid deciding cases requiring 
premature analysis of constitutional doctrine). Cass R. Sunstein recently has advanced 
a similar thesis, although under the theory that law, as such, is an "completely-
theorized" system, and therefore should not be extended beyond its normal confines. 
See Cass R. SUNSTEIN: General Propositions and Concrete Cases (with special 
reference to affirmative action and free speech), 31 W A K E FORREST L. REV. 369 
(1996). In the field of comparative constitutional law, Professor Howard has made 
similar arguments with respect to the possibility of finding universal laws to aid in the 
writing of new constitutions for the new democracies of the world, each state in 
his views being a constitutional world unto itself. See A. DICK HOWARD: The 
Indeterminacy of Constitutions, 31 WAKE FORREST L. REV. 383 (1996). 
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permits the Supreme Court to narrow or expand the scope of its precedents 
when necessary to adapt the constitution to new political forces, as this article 
will show, especially in interpreting the text and underlying postulates 
governing the distribution or attribution of competence between the federal 
government and the states, the doctrine of federalism. 1 5 This process 
facilitates the adaptation of the constitution to new realities. 
B. The Continental System and Constitutional Doctrine 
By contrast, the continental system is based on other premises 
concerning the function of judges and therefore their method of constitutional 
control, which in theory should result in less flexibility It would not be 
necessary to remind a student of continental law of the modern origins of 
the continental system: in the Napoleonic Code, as a unique source or the 
manifestation of the sovereignty of the people, or of the origins of that code 
and the Code of Justinian 1 6; nor the influence of the conception of law as 
science developed by German scholars in the 19th century 1 7 ; nor of the 
reality that the vast majority of judges in the continental system are state 
functionaries and that it was only in this century that European judges 
acquired the function of constitutional review, and then only the judges of 
specific constitutional courts. 1 8 It is clear that the United States does not 
share in this tradition, neither in the practical organization of the judicial 
power nor in the conception of law as a social science much like politics, 
economics or sociology. One can suppose for purposes of discussion, 
therefore, that the principal methodological difference between Anglo-
American and continental systems lies in their very conception of the sources 
of law. 
As noted, Anglo-Saxon law finds its sources primarily in the holdings of 
cases, while in the continental system sources are found in the general 
15. See, infra, text accompanying notes 61-67 (analyzing changes in the Supreme 
Court's jurisprudence for the protection of state sovereignty). 
16. See A. FERNÁNDEZ BARRIERO: La Tradición Romanistica en la Cultura 
Jurídica Europea 103-110 (1992). 
17. See ibid., 111-118. 
18. See Vicki C. JACKSON & Mark TUSHNET: op. cit., 456-491. 
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principles of l a w 1 9 (and, in the case of the Constitution, in its "superior 
values"). 2 0 Jurisprudence in itself has little value and, with few exceptions, 
does not function as precedent in the same way as common law, where in 
theory at least a single precedent binds. This gives the doctrine of legal 
scholars such a major role that students of the law and lawyers in Spain 
perhaps read academic commentary before they read judicial opinions, while 
one could say that American students and lawyers even after reading statutes 
do not believe they know what they require until they have read the opinions 
interpreting them. It might not be an exaggeration to say that sometimes 
lawyers do not even read statutes or regulations before researching judicial 
opinions. Along these lines, the American professor of comparative law, 
George Fletcher has said that when he was a young student in Europe, he 
learned from his German teacher that in the continental system "what cases 
said had less importance that what scholars thought the cases said or, at least, 
what scholars said the cases said. In that moment I understood the difference 
between the German and American legal traditions." 2 1 For Fletcher this also 
meant that in the Anglo-American system, scholars and judges thus have 
greater liberty to investigate jurisprudence as a source of law in a way that is 
impossible in the Continental system — that is, as "a source of experience, 
drama, and insight." 2 2 Be that as it may, at the very least we can say that, 
contrary to the Anglo-American system where cases rule, scholarly doctrine 
in the world of Continental law functions as the test of legitimacy. 
Continental law's emphasis on the primacy of doctrine manifests itself 
also in Spain's system of constitutional control, where responsibility for this 
function is concentrated in the hands of a small number of mandarins. Spain's 
Constitutional Tribunal exercises the power of constitutional control not only 
in concrete cases but also, to a limited degree, in relation to abstract questions 
19. Article 1.4 of the Spanish Civil Code provides that these "shall be applied as 
law or custom, without prejudice to their character as informing the legal system." 
(The original Spanish text provides: "se aplicaran en efecto de ley o costumbre, sin 
perjuicio de su carácter de informador del ordenamiento jurídico"). 
20 . Article 1.1 of the Constitution of Spain provides: "Spain is constituted as a 
social and democratic state of law, which advances liberty, justice, equality and 
political pluralism as the superior values of its legal order." (The original Spanish 
states: "España se constituye en un Estado social y democrático de Derecho, que 
propugna como valores superiores de su ordenamiento jurídico la libertad, la justicia, 
la igualdad y el pluralismo político....") 
2 1 . George P. FLETCHER: Comparative Law as a Subversive Discipline, 46 A M . 
J. COMP.L. 683, 692 1998). 
22 . Ibid. 
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unrelated to actual disputes between parties. 2 3 Furthermore, the Constitution 
makes clear that the opinions of the Constitutional Tribunal "that declare the 
unconstitutionality of a law or rule with legal effect and which do not limit 
themselves to having merely advisory effect have full effects as applied to 
a l l , " 2 4 the so-called erga omnes effect, 2 5 which theoretically does not exist in 
the Anglo-American system. 2 6 According to López Guerra, former vice-' 
president of the Tribunal, its opinions "establish the manner of interpreting as 
concordant the Constitution's apparently disconnected and contradictory 
precepts." 2 7 It has even been said that the Constitutional Tribunal functions 
as an "an integrating organ, since its function consists in searching for a 
dialectical synthesis between the unity of the state and the plurality of powers 
into which the state is divided, as much in the horizontal as in the vertical 
sense." 2 8 
Yet, these functions in the legal system of Spain establish a new 
methodological role for the Constitutional Tribunal, one that is perhaps 
related to the mode of analysis employed by the Supreme Court of the United 
States. Is it possible then that jurisprudence could also function as a source of 
law by means of the opinions of the Constitutional Tribunal? At the very 
least, one should note the López Guerra seeks to revive the dynamic tradition 
of Roman praetorian law, and perhaps the case law method, when he 
2 3 . See Luis LÓPEZ GUERRA: Las Sentencias Básicas del Tribunal Constitucional 
20-23 (2000). 
24 . The Constitution of Spain, Article 164.1 ("que declaran la inconstitucionalidad 
de una ley o de una norma con fuerza de ley y todas las que no se limiten a la 
estimación subjetiva de un derecho, tienen plenos efectos frente a todos"). In addition, 
judges are obligated to apply law "in accordance with the interpretation that results 
from the decisions given by the Constitutional Tribunal in all types of procedures." 
See Ley Orgánica del Poder Constitucional, Article 5.1 ("conforme a la interpretación 
que resulte de las resoluciones dictadas por el Tribunal Constitucional en todos tipos 
de procesos"). 
2 5 . See Jorge DE ESTEBAN & Pedro J. GONZÁLEZ-TREVIJANO: Curso de Derecho 
Constitucional Español III 211 (1994). 
2 6 . See TRIBE: op. cit., 254-58 (explaining that the dictum of Cooper, v. Aaron, 
358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958), does not generally represent the function or theory of judicial 
review in the United States). 
27 . See LÓPEZ GUERRA: op. cit., 17 ("establecen la forma de interpretar con-
cordantemente preceptos aparentemente opuestos, o desconectados entre sí, de la 
Constitución"). 
28. See DE ESTEBAN & GONZÁLEZ-TREVUANO, op. cit., 175 ("órgano integrador, 
puesto que su función consiste en buscar la síntesis dialéctica entre la unidad del 
Estado y la pluralidad de poderes en que se divide este, tanto en sentido horizontal, 
como vertical"). 
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comments that "constitutional jurisprudence's creative force derives from the 
binding force of its conclusions; not only its concrete decision concerning 
whether the rule in question does or does not conform to the Constitution but 
also in the reasoning contained in the opinion, its ratio decidendi, which 
reveals or discovers constitutional criteria or mandates to be followed by the 
other actors of the legal order." 2 9 In addition, even though the Civil Code 
does not include jurisprudence among the sources of ordinary law in the 
legal system, according to one author, the jurisprudence of the Constitutional 
Tribunal not only treats it as a source of constitutional law but also acts as 
though "the content of the Constitution is determined, by interpretive means, 
by the Constitution Tribunal." 3 0 If, indeed, the Constitutional Tribunal has 
this creative function generally, that function necessarily extends to the 
development of jurisprudence concerning Spain's system of autonomy. In 
fact, the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Tribunal has a unique role with 
respect to the development of constitutional doctrine for the "the new semi-
federal Spanish state," so much so, according to López Guerra, that one can 
speak of a "case law regime of Autonomy." 3 1 
29. See LÓPEZ GUERRA, op. cit., 24 ("la fuerza creadora de la jurisprudencia 
constitucional deriva de la fuerza vinculante de sus resoluciones; no solo de la deci-
sión concreta, sobre si la norma cuestionada es o no es conforme con la Constitución, 
sino también del razonamiento contenido en la Sentencia, de su ratio decidendi, que 
revela o descubre criterios o mandatos constitucionales a seguir por los demás actores 
del ordenamiento") (emphasis in the original); see ibid., 18 n. 5 (citing professor 
Italiano G. Rolla, who also believes that the "rationes decidendi" of Constitutional 
Tribunals "gives birth to a pretorian law capable of influencing the life of the legal 
system)("hace nacer un derecho pretoriano capaz de influir sobre la vida real del 
ordenamiento"). 
30. See IVÁN C. IBAN: Introducción al Derecho Español, 25 (2000) ("el contenido 
de la [Constitución] esta fijado, por vía interpretativa, por el Tribunal Consti-
tucional"). The same author argues for the conclusion that jurisprudence also is 
included in ordinary law indirectly, because "procedural law foresees the possibility of 
seeking review before the Supreme Court of a judicial act in violation of the legal 
order or its jurisprudence), which indicates that jurisprudence is deemed to constitute a 
source of law whose violation gives rise to a right to judicial relief." Ibid., 25-26 ("es 
la previsión en el Derecho procesal de la posibilidad de imponer un recurso de 
casación ante el Tribunal Supremo, contra resoluciones judiciales,.... por ... infracción 
de las normas del ordenamiento jurídico o la jurisprudencia") (internal quotations 
omitted). 
31. See LÓPEZ GuERRa: op. cit., 25 ("nuevo Estado semifederal español" that one 
can speak of. "un Estado jurisprudencia de las Autonomías"). Also according to Iván 
C. Iban, "as to what competences the Autonomous Communities may assume, the 
Constitution opts for an extraordinarily complex system, which obligates the 
Constitutional Tribunal to intervene to define its exact reach." IBAN: op. cit., 71 ("por 
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Therefore, in both the American and Spanish legal systems, federalism 
and autonomy, respectively, have a special relationship with each system's 
method of constitutional law. The next section of this article will explain how 
powers are distributed in each system and how jurisprudence plays a role in 
establishing that distribution. Thereafter it will be possible to explain how 
jurisprudence functions in the particular area of the external action of sub-
state entities and thereby provide a basis for evaluation of the role that case 
law method or jurisprudence can play in accommodating federalism and 
autonomy to current changes in the international system. 
II THE ALLOCATION OF PUBLIC POWER BY THE SOVEREIGN: 
FEDERALISM AS A SYSTEM OF POLITICAL COMPETITION AND 
AUTONOMY AS A MEANS TO SERVE THE PUBLIC INTEREST 
Relations between the center and periphery are both of constitutional 
dimension in the U.S. and Spain. Clearly, their historical origins distinguish 
them, with the center emerging as a creature of the current peripheral units in 
the U.S. and the current peripheral units emerging out of the unitary state in 
recent Spanish history. But, as this section will argue, the differences between 
federalism and autonomy lie less in these different historical trajectories than 
in their underlying rationales, with U.S. federalism reinforcing political 
competition as the bedrock of American democracy and Spanish autonomy 
implementing a vision of cooperative solidarity in the pursuit of the general 
interest. 
A. U.S. Federalism 
U.S. federalism is not even understood well in the United States. In 
recent years, the Supreme Court has given new meaning to the doctrine, new 
at least for the generations of professors, students and lawyers trained after 
the Second World War. It might be sufficient, for purposes of our analysis, to 
explicate the key recent opinions of the Supreme Court demonstrating the 
new vigor in federalism. Yet these recent opinions cannot be understood 
lo que toca a las competencias que pueden asumir las comunidades autónomas, la 
[Constitución] opta por un sistema extraordinariamente complejo que viene obligando 
al Tribunal Constitucional a intervenir para precisar su alcance exacto"). 
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without focusing on how federalism was conceived during the period between 
the political reform of President Roosevelt and the counter-revolution 
advanced by President Reagan as well as a series of Republican presidents 
who as much a Roosevelt were able to over time select a majority of the 
members of the Supreme Court. 
1. The Post-New Deal Constitution 
In theory, there are two types of limits on the power of the federal 
government of the United States. First, it is quite- clear that, at least with 
respect to internal matters, 3 2 the government of the United States enjoys only 
certain powers, whether explicit or implicit, although these powers may be 
elaborated in accordance with what is "necessary and proper" (which has 
been interpreted to reach everything which is useful). 3 3 Therefore, these 
powers have their own internal limits, known as the doctrine of "enumerated" 
powers. Second, even when a governmental act falls within the internal limits 
of the enumerated powers, that is to say within the competence attributed to 
the federal institution by the Constitution, in addition that federal act may be 
challenged on the basis of an external limit drawn from the Constitution, 
which in the case of federalism in principal part is the text and constitutional 
principles related to the 10th amendment to the Constitution, which reserves 
to the states or the people those powers which the Constitution has not 
delegated to the federal government or denied to the states. 
The trajectory of the doctrine of internal limits traces the economic 
history of the United States. During the decade of economic depression 
preceding World War II, President Roosevelt and the Congress that supported 
him launched a new politics known as the "New Deal," which imposed 
32. See, infra, text accompanying notes 41-42. 
33. See Me Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 415 (1819) (interpreting 
Article I, Section 8, Clause 18, the so-called "Necessary and Proper" Clause of the 
U.S. Constitution and, on that basis in relation to the explicit or enumerated powers to 
pay federal debts and impose federal taxes, affirming the creation of a Bank of the 
United States). According to John Marshall, Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, the 
Necessary and Proper Clause, taking into account that the Constitution had been 
written to last for the ages, had to be interpreted in the following way: "Let the end be 
legitimate, let it be within the scope of the constitution, and all means which are 
appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but 
consistent with the letter and spirit of the constitution, are constitutional." Ibid., All. 
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controls on prices and output of goods and services whether or not they 
involved commerce between citizens of different states. At first glance, this 
appeared to the Supreme Court of the day to have no legitimate relation to 
inter-state commerce, which the Constitution indicated was the premise for 
Congress' regulatory authority. 3 4 The text of the Constitution plainly 
provided that this power extended only to commerce "among" the states and 
therefore the Supreme Court in a series of opinions decided that the New Deal 
violated the Constitution. 3 5 These cases followed a line of jurisprudence more 
than forty years old, which had maintained that Congress could not regulate 
intra-state commerce if the effect on inter-state commerce was only indirect 
or if the commerce regulated was intrinsically intra-state. 3 6 
Without undermining these earlier precedents, the Supreme Court 
changed direction and affirmed the Congress's power to enact legislation 
regulating labor relations on a national scale, thus validating President 
Roosevelt's renewed efforts to address tendencies in,the free market economy 
then thought to have contributed to worsening the effects of economic 
depression. Deciding the famous case of NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel 
Corp., the Court held that the a regulated activity —in the facts of that case, 
the intra-state contract relationship between an employer and its employees— 
"affected" inter-state commerce in the sense required under the federal 
Constitution. 3 7 A few years later, in Wickard v. Filburn,38 the Supreme Court 
decided that Congress could regulate crops grown not for sale but rather 
solely for consumption, on the theory that such production and all similar 
production cumulatively had a potential effect on inter-state commerce. 
The Supreme Court's post-New Deal jurisprudence permitted the 
inference that the Constitution imposed no limits on federal regulatory power 
over the economy and anything that could conceivably affect the inter-state 
economy. In any event, the Court relied on that line of cases to approve even 
laws adopted by Congress in order to carry out a revolution in the protection 
of the fundamental rights of African-Americans, on the theory that American 
34. See ibid., Article I, section 8, clause 3 ("To regulate commerce with foreign 
nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes."). 
35. See Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 256 (1936). 
36. See United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1, 12 (1895)(holding that the 
regulation of intra-state manufacturing did not fall within the power to regulated inter-
state commerce) 
37. See NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel, 295 U.S. 495, 550 (1937). 
38. See Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. I l l , 121 (1942). 
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racism reduced the participation of African-Americans in federally-protected 
inter-state commerce, not only through blocking their access to the 
instrumentalities of inter-state commerce, such as inter-state highways 
constructed with federal assistance, but also their access to intra-state 
activities that could affect inter-state commerce. 3 9 In addition, with the 
approval of the Supreme Court Congress created in effect a federal code of 
crimes, where for more than a century the general "police power" —that is to 
say, the function of protecting the public primarily through criminal law— 
was exclusively located in the states. 4 0 Thus interpreted, federal power over 
inter-state commerce could justify governmental acts directed toward 
the construction of a new —and perhaps, in President Johnson's phrase, 
"Great"— society. 
Another key factor in the capacity of the federal government to secure 
the harmonization of state policy in accordance with federal preferences was 
the growth of federal tax receipts, which permitted the federal government to 
offer states a percentage of those revenues in return for state commitments to 
follow federal harmonization of state policy in any number of areas. This 
power to condition the distribution of resources permitted the federal 
government to persuade the states even to change the drinking age in all states 
to a federal standard, 4 1 even though the constitutional amendment repealing 
an earlier constitutional amendment prohibiting alcohol had given states 
exclusive power over this subject. 4 2 Now that there were no true internal 
limits on the federal commerce power, the growth of federal resources 
enabled the transfer to the federal government of responsibility for matters 
that had since the beginning of the Republic been the responsibility of the 
states. 
39. See Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964) 
(sustaining application of anti-discrimination law to a hotel near a federally-subsidized 
highway); and Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964)(same result with respect 
to a restaurant near a federal highway). 
4 0 . See U.S. v. Perez, 402 U.S. 146 (1971)(sustaining a federal law grounded in 
the determination that intra-state "loan sharking," defined in terms of credit supplied 
with extortionate or excessive rates of interest, was the kind of activity employed by 
inter-state organized crime). 
4 1 . See U.S. v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987)(requiring only that the conditions for 
provision of federal funds to states be connected to the general welfare and have some 
connection to defined federal projects or programs). 
4 2 . See Constitution of the United States, Amendment 21, section 2 (which 
prohibits inter-state commerce in alcohol for consumption in a state when such 
consumption would violate the law of that state). 
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Therefore, the New Deal generation and its successors began to believe 
that the protections of federalism were only those that were deemed necessary 
by the members of the Senate. This was because in that chamber of the 
legislature the peoples of the states were represented equally, thereby giving 
the small states representation disproportionate to their population, and 
assuring, in contrast to the House of Representatives where representation is 
proportionate to population, that the interests of states as states would be 
defended during the legislative process. 4 3 (Admittedly, however, this 
protection of states as such diminished after an amendment to the Constitution 
in 1913 transferred from state legislatures to the peoples of the states the right 
directly to select their representatives to the Federal Senate. 4 4 ) According 
to this theory, the 10th Amendment functions solely as a political principle, 
rather than as a legal basis upon which to challenge federal action. 
Indeed, after a few doctrinal turns, 4 5 the Supreme Court declared that the 
10th Amendment was not a basis for judicial relief even in the case of federal 
regulation of a state government's relationship with its own administrative 
staff. 4 6 
Yet, the Court's doctrinal turns manifested continuing internal tension in 
its reasoning, for even during this period, the Court evidenced some hesitation 
over the absence of protection for state sovereignty implied in the post-New 
Deal jurisprudence. For expansion of federal power which provoked an 
initial, failed effort to interpret the 10th amendment as imposing some limits 
on federal power grounded in historical experience that would supply criteria 
through which to distinguish sovereign acts of states from those activities in 
which they were simply participants in commerce. This distinction also found 
its way into a related area of constitutional law, the so-called "Dormant 
Commerce Clause," which prohibits states from intervening to undercut the 
federally-protected, common market. For more than a hundred years, the 
Supreme Court considered this prohibition to be implied in the express grant 
43. See Herbert WECHSLER: The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of 
the States in the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. 
L. REV. 543 (1954). 
44. See Constitution of the United States, Amendment 17 (1913). 
45. See National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), overruling 
Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183 (1968) (deciding that the 10th Amendment did not 
invalidate federal regulation of labor conditions of state employers). 
46. See García v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528 
(1985), overruling National League of Cities v. Usery, 26 U.S. 833 (1976). 
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of authority for the federal government to regulate inter-state commerce. 4 7 In 
the late stages of the expansion of federal power under the Commerce Clause, 
the Supreme Court found an exception to the prohibition under the Dormant 
Commerce Clause when a state merely participated in, and did not regulate, 
its market. The Court decided in Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp. that the 
State of Maryland had not violated the Dormant Commerce Clause when, in a 
program to facilitate elimination of abandoned automobiles, it had purchased 
those wrecks from its own residents at prices higher than those offered to 
non-residents. The Court declared that the state as a purchaser was free to 
purchase from whomever and at whatever price it wished, presumably for the 
purpose of benefiting preferentially its own residents in the expenditure of 
state funds. 4 8 
Turning explicitly to the 10th Amendment in the same year that Hughes 
v. Alexandria Scrap recognized in the Dormant Commerce Clause context of 
a states' rights as market participant to express its sovereignty, the Court 
also decided that the exercise of federal regulatory power over commerce, 
although within the internal limits of that power, could yet violate the 
Constitution. In National League of Cities v. Usery, the Court held that state 
sovereignty included the relationship between a state and its employers 
because that relationship had traditionally been part of state sovereignty. 4 9 
The state could thus favor or disfavor its own employees as it wished, without 
federal interference. Arguably, as in Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap, the Court 
saw in the state's traditional relationships with its residents and employees the 
core of state sovereignty. Yet, after attempting to apply this formula in a 
series of cases , 5 0 in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority a 
majority of the Court declared that it was not possible to construct a stable 
test to protect state sovereignty under the 10th Amendment, because history 
did not supply criteria that were sufficiently clear upon which to base the 
reasoning of a judicial decision. 5 1 In effect, the Supreme Court decided 
47. See Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299, 318 (1852); see 
TRIBE: op. cit., 1030--1047 (treating this case as an example of that doctrine, even 
through the opinion explicitly makes clear that the Supreme Court interpreted a 
federal statute to govern and thereby invalidate a Pennsylvania rule requiring all 
foreign ships carrying specified tonnage of bituminous coal to employ local pilots 
while in Pennsylvania waters). 
48. See Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 833 (1976). 
49. See National League of Cities v. Usery, op. cit., 840-45. 
50. See TRIBE, op. cit., 863-77 (analyzing those opinions). 
51. See García v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, op. cit., 546-47. 
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that, because the option of reasoned common-law decision-making was 
unavailable, its only recourse was to give up on the task of given meaning to 
the 10th Amendment; thus, it concluded, citizens would have to rely on the 
so-called "political safeguards of federalism" to protect state sovereignty. 
2 . The Neo-Federalist Response 
After a half-century of the creation of a federal common market and the 
construction of a national state capable of affecting perhaps every aspect of 
life relating to that national market, by the mid-1980s the conclusion 
that the "political safeguards of federalism" were the only permissible mode 
of constitutional protection for state sovereignty became increasingly 
problematic. Indeed, it did not survive a decade, for as the political process in 
the U.S. changed course, and as its composition changed, so did the Supreme 
Court. Rather than leaving it to the political process to amend the 
Constitution, the Court instead returned to the roots of the U.S. political 
system, its re-reading of the philosophy of the Framers of the U.S. 
Constitution, to construct the tools that would enable it to change direction so 
as to adapt to the nation's new political balance and the Court's own changed 
composition. The Supreme Court articulated this new conception of 
federalism most clearly in U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton.52 
In U.S. Term Limits, the issue addressed by the Court arose out of a 
popular movement for the establishment of limits to the terms of state 
representatives to the federal House and Senate, implemented without federal 
constitutional amendment and instead by means of state law. (Notably, the 
17th Amendment was preceded by a movement also involving only state 
action, one in which state legislators committed themselves to follow a 
popular vote for the selection of representatives to the federal Senate.) In this 
particular case, the State of Arkansas had imposed term limits on its 
representatives and senators, not by means of a state law but rather by means 
of a popular referendum thereby amending the constitution of Arkansas. 
The narrow legal question was whether the text of the federal constitution 
establishing the qualifications of office for federal representatives and 
senators was or was not a complete enumeration of those qualifications, 
which would determine whether or not the states could add to those 
52. See U.S. Term Limits v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779 (1995). 
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qualifications, including the criterion that a senator or representative must not 
have served more than a specified number of terms. 5 3 The majority and 
minority of the Supreme Court divided on this narrow interpretive point, but 
their reasons for reading the controlling constitutional clause differently shed 
light on a more fundamental difference concerning their views on the relation 
between the states and the federal government. 
For the majority, Justice Stevens concluded —following what he 
considered to be the highly-persuasive, if not controlling, precedent that 
Congress itself could not itself add qualifications to those found in the text of 
the Constitution 5 4— that the constitutional text was complete in itself and 
that, therefore, the states also were not authorized to add qualifications. His 
premise for identifying the reserved powers of the states under the 10th 
Amendment was that these powers included only those powers held by states 
prior to the transfer of the enumerated powers to the federal government by 
the Federal Constitution of 1789. Accordingly, the states could not reserve a 
power to add to qualifications for a federal office not in existence prior to its 
creation by the Constitution. 5 5 Furthermore, Stevens supposed that the 
representatives and senators selected by a state were not representatives of 
merely that state but rather, at the same time, were representatives of the 
people of all of the United States. Thus, one state by itself could not interfere 
with the relationship established in the Constitution between a federal 
representative or senator and the people of the United States as a whole . 5 6 
Perhaps even more significant for the future trajectory of the Supreme 
Court's doctrine in this area, Justice Kennedy, whose fifth vote was necessary 
to form a majority for the opinion written by Justice Stevens, added his own 
analysis. In his opinion, Kennedy emphasized the dual sovereignty of the 
states and the federation, each meriting the protection of the Supreme Court. 
53. See Constitution of the United States, Article I, section 2, clause 2 ("no Person 
shall be a Representative who shall not have attained to the Age of twenty five Years, 
and been seven Years a Citizen of the United States, and who shall not, when elected, 
be an Inhabitant of that State in which he shall be chosen") and Article I, section 3, 
n. 3 ("No Person shall be a Senator who shall not have attained to the Age of thirty 
Years, and been nine years a Citizen of the United States, and who shall not, when 
elected, be an Inhabitant of that State in which he shall be chosen"). The related issue 
of whether the measure could be treated as a ballot access limitation, rather than a 
term limit adding to the qualifications of office, is not pertinent to the analysis of this 
essay. 
54. See Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969). 
55. See U.S. Term Limits, op cit., 804. 
56. See ibid., 803. 
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In a statement cited by the Supreme Court in later cases protecting state 
sovereignty, Justice Kennedy wrote: "Federalism was our Nation's own 
discovery. The Framers split the atom of sovereignty. It was the genius of 
their idea that our citizens would have two political capacities, one state and 
one federal, each protected from incursion by the other. The resulting 
Constitution created a legal system unprecedented in form and design, 
establishing two orders of government, each with its own direct relationship, 
its own privity, its own set of mutual rights and obligations to the people 
who sustain it and are governed by i t " 5 7 One should note that the U.S. 
constitutional theory articulated by James Madison, the most famous framer 
of the Constitution 5 8 —at least according to one of Madison's most well-
known modern interpreters, Bruce Ackerman 5 9 — similarly emphasized not 
only the dual American citizenship but also the dual capacity of the people of 
the United States, in the following sense: if the people are ultimately the only 
source of law, one justifies the superiority of constitutional law over normal 
law only to the extent that "the people" constitutes itself in a political 
movement for the creation of higher-order law. But the two different 
sovereignties in U.S. federalism imply that there are two different "sovereign 
peoples" and each person is a "citizen exercising powers of sovereignty" only 
at the moment each of these sovereignties assembles to create higher order 
law. This would imply that citizens participating in one political process, as 
was the case for the citizens of Arkansas in U.S. Term Limits in amending 
their state constitution, were not exercising their powers of sovereignty with 
respect to the other, the national political community, for clearly in that case 
the separate federal political community capable of creating superior law 
of national scope had not assembled through a constitutionally-prescribed 
amendment process. Consistent with this line of reasoning, Justice Kennedy's 
emphasis on the dual political communities and dual sets of rights and 
responsibilities implied that the Supreme Court was obligated to protect both 
sets of political processes, the state as much as the federal, which in turn 
foreshadowed stronger Supreme Court protection of state sovereignty against 
federal power. 
With respect to the conflict between federal power over commerce and 
state sovereignty, the search for new doctrines began in New York v. United 
57. See ibid., 8 3 6 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
58 . See James MADISON: The Federalist, Nos. 10, 38 -39 and 51 (Clinton Rossiter 
ed., 1961). 
5 9 . See generally BRUCE ACKERMAN: We the People (1991). 
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States.60 In that case, the Supreme Court concluded that federalism principles 
rooted in the Constitution, although not strictly grounded in the 10th 
Amendment, imposed certain implicit limits on federal conduct. This opinion, 
together with Printz v. United States,61 establish that there are constitutional 
limits on the federal government's power to build the common market, 
although these limits operate to protect the two political processes established 
under the principles of dual sovereignty as reconstructed in U.S. Term Limits, 
rather than a specific content whether defined in terms of particular powers or 
historically- approved activities. 
New York involved a challenge against a federal statute seeking to give 
effect to a plan that had in fact originated in a state effort to stimulate the 
construction of storage sites for low-level nuclear waste. The provisions 
requiring states to "take title" over certain nuclear wastes or regulate those 
wastes according to criteria established by Congress was deemed to violate 
the Constitution's principles of federalism, even though the regulatory 
standards imposed by Congress were identical to those initially proposed by 
the states, including the State of New York. 6 2 Because it was clear under 
settled doctrine that the federal government lacked the power to direct the 
states to take title over private property, the only question remaining was 
whether the federal government had the right to direct a state to exercise its 
legislative powers in a particular way. According to Justice O'Connor, the 
protection of both the state and federal political processes is at risk when the 
federal government obligates a state government to exercise its legislative 
powers. This is because accountability in both political processes would be 
diminished, when representatives in either political system would seek to 
avoid responsibility for the costs and other negative consequences of any 
policy choice. In New York, both the states and the federal government could 
plausibly deny political responsibility by blaming the other for their role in 
the policy choice, and the true costs to taxpayers of the policy never were 
clearly addressed at the federal level, because these costs were shifted to the 
states. This confusion, in turn, would frustrate the capacity of citizens in 
either political system to vindicate their own interests, including even their 
interest in the critical decision concerning which level of government, the 
60. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992). 
61. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 98 (1997). 
62. See New York v. United States, op cit., 153. 
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state or the federal, should be given responsibility for solving the low-level 
nuclear waste problem. 6 3 
The theory of federalism as reinforcing accountability in the political 
process was extended in Printz when Congress sought to require the local 
police departments of the states independently to conduct background 
investigations on potential handgun purchasers during a specified period until 
a federal database of ineligible purchasers was compiled. Justice Scalia, 
speaking for the majority, explained that the principles of New York 
precluding the federal government from requiring the state legislative 
branch to adopt a federal policy were equally applicable when the federal 
government attempted to obligate the state executive to execute a federal 
policy. According to Justice Scalia, when the federal Congress imposed 
a policy and obligations on the states without itself paying for the 
implementation of those obligations, not only did it avoid responsibility for 
itself finding the resources to implement that policy, but it also intervened 
in the state decision-making process on how best to use the state's own 
resources. Accordingly, the state would be able to blame the federal 
government for the failures of a policy and federal representatives would be 
able to take credit for a policy's successes without having to pay the political 
price of justifying the additional tax revenues implementation of that policy 
would require. 6 4 Notably, Justice Breyer in dissent explained his doubts 
concerning the doctrinal course taken by the majority by making reference to 
the experience of the European Economic Community (EEC) in requiring its 
State Members to execute EEC "Directives" through the adoption of national 
legislation. In this way Justice Breyer sought to establish that accountability 
in the political process was nonetheless possible even if Congress were to 
employ means, such as those employed by the EEC, notwithstanding 
the majority's concern that principles of U.S. federalism would be 
compromised. 6 5 Justice Scalia replied that U.S. federalism had different 
origins from European constitutionalism, in particular that the Framers of 
63. See ibid. 168-69. 
64. See Printz v. United States, op. cit., 923-25. Perhaps more important, Scalia 
added that the method employed by Congress in this case could violate federal 
separation of powers principals, because the Congress could be seen as employing 
state executive power to execute a federal policy when the Constitution gave the 
federal executive power exclusively to the executive branch. Ibid., 923 n. 12. 
65. See ibid., 976-977 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
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U.S. federalism had rejected European models of government in effect during 
the period when the U.S. Constitution was founded. 6 6 
With the transformation of the federalist theory of dual sovereignty now 
as dual citizenship, the Supreme Court had available to it the theoretical tools 
to reinterpret its jurisprudence concerning the Federal Commerce Clause 
power. In United States v. Lopez61 and to some degree also in United States 
v. Morrison,68 the Court sought to vindicate the interests of states in their own 
self-government through protecting the boundary between state and federal 
political processes. A majority of the Court in Lopez decided that the federal 
inter-state commerce power did not extend so far as to allow Congress to 
enact a law prohibiting, with certain exceptions, possession of handguns 
within a specified distance from schools. Chief Justice Rehnquist explained 
for the Court that Congress, in the process of considering the legislation, had 
not made clear its reasons for concluding that handgun possession near 
schools affected inter-state commerce. 6 9 This key finding, therefore, enabled 
the minority justices to interpret the majority's opinion as following the 
doctrinal path blazed in New York and U.S Term Limits seeking to protect the 
political process so as to ensure the vigor of the "political safeguards" of U.S. 
federalism. 7 0 Yet Justice Rehnquist, seeking to reconcile the new doctrine 
with the Court's earlier jurisprudence, also explained that none of the stongest 
precedents in support of federal power over inter-state commerce had 
employed the so-called "cumulative effect" theory articulated in Wickard v. 
Filburn in a context not involving activity of an economic character. 7 1 
Accordingly, Justice Rehnquist's overall view of the case was informed by 
the fear that, if federal commerce power were extended to non-economic 
contexts such as was the case in Lopez, it would be possible for the federal 
government to regulate matters, such as local public education or the family, 
that since the beginning of the Republic had been regulated by state law 
a lone. 7 2 
The tension evident in Lopez between the old and new federalisms is 
even more evident in Morrison. On one hand, although Lopez's emphasis on 
66. Sec ibid., 921 n. 11. 
67. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995). 
68. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000). 
69. See United States v. Lopez, op cit., 563. 
70. See ibid., 615, 619 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
71. See ibid., 560. 
72. See ibid., 564 
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the need for transparency in the federal legislative process seems to be fully 
consistent with the approach articulated in U.S. Term Limits, New York, and 
Printz, the Court's majority in Morrison may have sought to establish internal 
limits on federal power over inter-state commerce framed in terms of a 
particular substantive content, in a way reminiscent of the classification 
methodology the Court employed to protect state sovereignty prior to the 
interpretive revolution of Jones & Laughlin Steel and Wickard v. Filburn. In 
Morrison, a case concerning sexual assault at a public university in the state 
of Virginia, the Court rejected the use of the Commerce Clause power as 
the basis for a federal law providing civil remedies. Again, Chief Justice 
Rehnquist explained that the federal civil remedy was in no way 
related to inter-state commerce because the "cumulative effect" method was 
inapplicable to non-economic subject matter, such as was involved in that 
case, even though Congress had expressly made clear findings that it believed 
that the intra-state activities regulated by the statute did indeed affect inter-
state commerce in the sense required by the Constitution. 7 3 In accordance 
with the need to protect dual sovereignty, Rehnquist added that the protection 
of political accountability warranted the construction of a very clear boundary 
between "the local" and "the national," a point Rehnquist considered implicit 
in all the Court's Commerce Clause precedents. 7 4 Accordingly, it could be 
argued that Morrison sought to reverse the Court's course in the protection of 
federalism toward tradition and history as the criteria for distinguishing 
"the local" from "the national," although the Court had deemed those criteria 
inadequate in Garcia, in interpreting the external, 10th Amendment limit on 
federal intrusion into state sovereignty. 
On the other hand, Rehnquist's majority opinion focused on the fact 
that, like the law invalidated in Lopez, the statutory provision in question in 
Morrison lacked a jurisdictional element, which implied that, in order to grant 
a federal remedy, federal courts hearing cases brought under the statute would 
not need to determine the existence of facts establishing their jurisdiction, 
namely, that the facts of the case affected inter-state commerce in the sense 
required by the Constitution; this was so even though other provisions of the 
73. See United States v. Morrison, op. cit., 610-18 (Rehnquist, J., majority). If this 
broad reading of United States v. Morrison is correct, it may well call into question the 
Court's past approval of Congress' reliance on the Commerce clause to enact anti-
discrimination legislation generally, but most notably in the context of racial 
discrimination. See Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States and Katzenbach v. 
McClung, op. cit. 
1A. See United States v. Morrison, op cit., 616 nn. 6-7. 
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statute imposing federal criminal sanctions did include such a jurisdictional 
element and on that basis had been approved by several federal appellate 
courts . 7 5 With the absence of that jurisdictional element in the statute's civil 
provisions, Congress in effect could circumvent the judiciary's own power to 
determine the basis for its own jurisdiction, which would have permitted the 
Congress to avoid responsibility for crossing the constitutional frontier 
between "the local" and "the national." In addition, as in Printz, this act could 
constitute an invasion by the legislative branch of the federal government of 
the territory of another branch of government, in this case the judicial branch. 
One must note that the U.S. system of separation of powers protects not only 
the separation between the legislative and executive branches but also ensures 
the integrity of the judicial branch against invasion from the political 
branches. Thus, the limits imposed on the judicial power by the statute 
invalidated in Morrison would have permitted Congress to avoid not only its 
responsibility to the people not to transgress the limits of its powers under the 
Federal Commerce Clause but also the limits on its powers imposed the 
constitutionally-based integrity of the judicial branch. Thus, it might still be 
possible to interpret Morrison, not as implementing a theory of federalism 
grounded in the protection of determinate substantive content demarcated by 
history and tradition, but rather as the essentially procedural doctrine directed 
towards the maintenance of political competition between the states and the 
federal government seeking the support of their citizens, respectively, as 
elaborated in U.S. Term Limits, New York, Printz, and Lopez. 
Notably, writing again in dissent in Morrison, Justice Breyer did not 
share Chief Justice Rehnquist's desire to impose clear boundaries between 
"the local" and "the national." Breyer argued in Morrison, as he had argued in 
Printz, that lessons from the study of comparative constitutional law could 
support a more flexible approach. In this case, he invoked European-style 
"subsidiarity" as a possible model for conceiving a less rigid means for 
facilitating the allocation of authority between the federal government and the 
states so to ensure the protection of the interests of the states and accordingly 
the protection of the interests of their citizens. 7 6 It is to this conception of the 
relationship between the central government and sub-state entities, which 
75. See ibid., 6 1 4 n. 5. 
76. See ibid., 654, 663 (BREYER, J.: dissenting opinion citing: BERMANN: supra n. 
1; Vicki JACKSON: Federalism and the Uses and Limits of Law, 111 Harv. L. Rev. 
2 1 8 0 (1998); and Steven GARDBAUM: Rethinking Constitutional Federalism, 
14 Texas. L. Rev. 7 9 5 (1996)). 
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focuses on cooperation for the maximization of citizens' interests rather than 
the protection of political competition, that we now turn. 
B. Spanish Autonomy 
Doctrine concerning autonomy enjoyed by Spain's Autonomous 
Communities makes clear that —although the Constitution does not refer to 
the Autonomous Communities as part of the central state, indeed implicitly 
referring to the "State" in such a way as to exclude the Autonomous 
Communities— they are indeed deemed to be part of the unitary Spanish 
s tate . 7 7 In addition, it is quite clear that the ruling principle of this unitary, 
albeit autonomous, state is that each entity's autonomy is ordered in terms of 
the interests of the Spanish people rather than the interests of government 
organs themselves. The theory operates in the following way: general 
interests are more important than regional interests, and the power of self-
government reaches only so far as the management by the regions (including 
the provinces of Spain, which also enjoy their own sphere of autonomy) do 
not conflict with the general interests of the people defended by the central 
organs of government. 7 8 
The text reflects this overall constitutional purpose of policy 
coordination. Although certain areas are deemed in theory to be exclusively 
national —including "international relations" 7 9; "foreign commerce" 8 0 ; 
"maritime fishing, without prejudice to the competence of the Autonomous 
Communities over the organization of that sector" 8 1 — the precise boundaries 
are not finally determined by the initial constitutional allocation of 
responsibilities. On one hand, the Autonomous Communities may assume 
responsibility over these matters by means of organic laws providing for "the 
development of the economy of the Autonomous Community subject to the 
77. See José Juan GONZÁLEZ ENCINAR: El Estado Unitario-Federal: La Auto-
nomía como principio estructural del Estado 58-71 and 111-123 (1985); see also 
Javier RUIPEREZ: Constitución y Autodeterminación 129-143 (1995). 
78. See Antonio TORRES DEL MORAL: 2 Principios de Derecho Constitucional 
295-373 (1992). 
79. The Constitution of Spain, Article 149.3 ("relaciones internacionales"). 
80. Ibid., Article 149.10 ("comercio exterior"). 
81. Ibid., Article 149.19 ("pesca marítima, sin perjuicio a las competencias que en 
la ordenación del sector se atribuyan a las Comunicadas Autónomas"). 
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objectives established by national economic policy." 8 2 Also, the central state 
may "in areas of national competence ... attribute to any or all of the 
Autonomous Communities the authority to adopt for itself legislative rules 
within the scope of the principles, bases, and directives fixed by the law of the 
state." 8 3 On the other, the central state "may adopt laws establishing 
principles necessary to harmonize the regulatory rules of the Autonomous 
Communities, even in the case of subject matter within their competence, 
when this is required by the general interest. It is the responsibility of the 
Spanish Parliament by absolute majority of each house, to make this 
determination." 8 4 Thus, the overriding theme is one of centrally-directed 
policy coordination. 
A structural interpretation also suggests that the logic of harmonization 
under Spain's Constitution, much like harmonization efforts under the law of 
the EEC, undermines the protection of regional interests. One could note that 
—contrary to the United States, where dual sovereignty expresses itself in 
two systems of courts, two systems of law, and in theory, through the 10th 
Amendment reserves to the states any residual authorities not granted by the 
Constitution— Spanish Autonomy provides for only one system of courts, 8 5 
for the most part one system of civil and criminal l aw, 8 6 and reserves to the 
central government all powers not given to the Autonomous Communities. 
Indeed, it is clear that the exercise of authority by an Autonomous 
Community depends in the first instance on the inclusion of that authority in 
the statute establishing the Autonomous Community, 8 7 and insofar as there 
82. Ibid., Article 148.13 ("fomento del desarrollo económico de la Comunidad 
Autónoma dentro los objetivos marcados por la política económica nacional"). 
83. Ibid., Article 150.1 ("en materias de competencia estatal... atribuir a todas o a 
alguna de las Comunidades Autónomas la facultad de dictar, para sí mismas, normas 
legislativas en el marco de los principios, bases y directrices fijados por una ley 
estatal"). 
84. Ibid., Article 150.3 ("podrá dictar leyes que establezcan los principios nece-
sarios para armonizar las disposiciones normativas de las Comunidades Autónomas, 
aun en el caso de materias atribuidas a la competencia de estas, cuando así lo exija el 
interés general. Corresponde a las Cortes Generales, por mayoría absoluta de cada 
Cámara, la apreciación de esta necesidad."). 
85. The Constitution of Spain, Article 117.5 ("El principio de la unidad jurisdic-
cional es la base de la organización y el funcionamiento de los Tribunales."). 
86. See IBAN: op. cit., 141-43. 
87. Yet, inclusion in a statute establishing a community's autonomy of a 
competence violating the constitutionaly-required allocation of competences could 
still later face constitutional challenge, although early autonomy statutes might be 
blessed with a presumption of constitutionality. Compare Pablo PÉREZ TREMPS: 
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are doubts one refers to the supplementary function of the law of the central 
s tate . 8 8 
Close inspection of the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Tribunal 
reveals full support for policy harmonization and centralized coordination. In 
Subvenciones al Turismo Rural, while the Constitutional Tribunal declares 
that "State coordination is constitutionally permissible only if 'it were 
necessary to ensure the full effectiveness of a policy within the scope of the 
basic organization of a sector and to guarantee the fulfillment and enjoyment 
of its full potential throughout the national territory, taking into account the 
need not to exceed the budget allocated to that sector'," a close reading of the 
full opinion indicates that in reality central state power is far broader than 
even this dictum suggests. 8 9 In the same way, when the Constitutional 
Constitución Española y Comunidad Europea, 112 (1993) (expressing doubt as to the 
constitutionality of the provision of the Autonomy Statute for the Basque Country 
insisting that no treaty may diminish the authorities granted to the Basque 
Autonomous Community without first amending the Statute itself); and, infra, text 
accompanying notes 125-26 (citing the Judgment of the Constitutional Tribunal, 
No. 252/88, December 20, 1988, Case on Comercio de Carnes, fund. jur. n° 2 
(affirming the supremacy of systematic interpretation of the Constitution over 
Autonomy Statutes). 
88. Article 149 of the Constitution of Spain provides that "Authorities not 
expressly attributed by this Constitution to the State may be exercised by the 
Autonomous Communities by virtue of their respective Statutes. Competence over 
those matters that have not been assumed by the Statutes on Autonomy shall belong to 
the State, whose rules in the case of conflict shall be superior to those Autonomous 
Communities with respect to all matters not within their exclusive competence. State 
law shale, in all cases, supplement the law of the Autonomous Communities." Ibid. 
("Las materias no atribuidas expresamente al Estado por esta Constitución podrán 
corresponder a las Comunidades Autónomas, en virtud de sus respectivos Estatutos. 
La competencia sobre las materias que no se hayan asumido por los Estatutos de 
Autonomía corresponderá al Estado, cuyas normas prevalecerán en caso de conflicto, 
sobre las de las Comunidades Autónomas en todo lo que no este atribuido a la 
exclusiva competencia de estas. El derecho estatal será, en todo caso, supletorio del 
derecho de las Comunidades Autónomas.") 
89. Judgment of the Constitutional Tribunal, No. 75/89, April 21, 1989, Case on 
Subvenciones al turismo rural, fund. jur. no. 5 (citing STC 95/1986) ("la gestión 
directa por el Estado... sólo sería constitucionalmente admisible si resultase imprescin-
dible para asegurar su plena efectividad dentro de la ordenación básica del sector y 
para garantizar las mismas posibilidades de obtención y disfrute por parte de sus 
potenciales destinatarios en todo el territorio nacional, siendo al tiempo un medio 
necesario para evitar que se sobrepase la cuantía global de los fondos o de los créditos 
que hayan de destinarse al sector"). 
It is possible to read the Tribunal's judgment in this case as strongly protective of 
the rights of the Autonomous Communities. This is because in its judgment the 
Tribunal recognized that the central government was competent to "coordinate 
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Tribunal stated in Ordenación de Transportes Terrestres that "the 
supplementary character of State law... does not of itself constitute a grant of 
authority," in reality it expressed no more than a tautology that did 
not undercut the authority of the central state to pursue policies of 
harmonization. 9 0 Accordingly, a close reading of the relevant opinions both 
economic planning" but not to "encourage any activity relating to tourism." Ibid., 
fund. jur. no. 4 ("coordinación de la planificación económica" but not "para fomentar 
cualquier actividad en materia de turismo."). It thus decided that the government had 
invaded a competence reserved to the Autonomous Communities with respect to 
tourism, noting that "the matter was precisely one in which regional uniqueness and 
peculiarities are more relevant and in which direct management by the Autonomous 
Communities of government assistance to the sector is necessary to define and achieve 
their own policies concerning the marginal and atypical features of the tourist sector, 
applying means selected by the State but adapting them to the particular circumstances 
of their territory." Ibid, fund. jur. no. 5 ("precisamente de una materia en la que las 
singularidades y peculiaridades regionales han de ser más relevantes y en las que la 
gestión directa de las ayudas por las Comunidades Autónomas resulta mas necesaria 
para poder definir y llevar a cabo una política propia en relación con esos sectores 
turístico marginales o atípicos, aplicando las medidas estatales pero adaptándolas a las 
peculiares circunstancias de su territorio"). 
Nonetheless, this is not the only possible reading of the opinion. The Tribunal also 
observed that the particular facts of the case did not relate to "exceptional measures 
seeking to balance inequalities in regions or sectors but rather in encouraging in 
general throughout the national territory distinct tourist activities differing from the 
general supply of tourist activites available throughout the country." Ibid, ("medidas 
excepcionales que traten de reequilibrar desigualdades regionales o sectoriales, sino de 
fomentar en general en todo el territorio nacional actividades turísticas distintas de las 
que constituye la masificada oferta turística común"). This language suggests that the 
disposition of the case in favor of the Autonomous Community, Galicia, depended 
entirely on the narrow point that the contradiction between the asserted objectives of 
the central state and the means it chose to achieve them, rather than on the broader 
claim that there were intrinsic limits on the central government's use of the power to 
subsidize the activities of the Autonomous Communities. 
90. Judgment of the Constitutional Tribunal, No. 118/96, June 27, 1996, Case on 
Ordenación de Transportes Terrestres, fund. jur. no. 6 ("la supletoriedad del Derecho 
estatal ... por su misma naturaleza, no comporta atribución competencial alguna"). 
Nonetheless, the Tribunal characterized the question in issue as narrow and of limited 
significance, premising its reasoning on the idea that the State "lacked specific 
authority" with respect to the precise conduct at issue; and, with respect to the 
supplementary effect of State law. Namely, whether it could in itself function as a 
source of law, the Tribunal noted that "the precept that is challenged appears to be 
tautological, which could perhaps be accused of being wrong but not of being 
unconstitutional." Ibid., fund. jur. no. 3 ("carece de competencias especificas" but "el 
precepto que se impugna tiene un marco carácter tautológico, por lo que podría ser 
tachado de técnicamente incorrecto; pero no de inconstitucional"). Accordingly, the 
Tribunal's opinion did not in any way diminish the superiority of State law insofar as 
it is based on authorities other than the general supplementary effect of all State law. 
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with respect to the power to condition funding of policies implemented by the 
autonomous communities and with respect to the supplementary function 
of State law, reveals that while neither the power to subsidize nor the 
supplementary function of State law in themselves constitute powers that 
permit the State to direct the activities of the Autonomous Communities, 
together these authorities function to support and facilitate the State's 
authority recognized by the Constitutional Tribunal to pursue policies of 
national harmonization. 
Perhaps it would be useful in this context to observe that the principle of 
harmonization is similar to that employed by the European Commission, and 
approved by the Court of Justice of the European Communities, to facilitate 
European integration and the development of an acquis communitaire. It has 
been written that the EU principle of harmonization in itself has no logical 
l imits. 9 1 To correct this defect, and thereby restrain the expansionist 
tendencies of the European harmonization project as well as protect the 
autonomy of the Member States of the European Union, the Treaty of 
Maastricht for the first time included in the acquis communitaire the principle 
of subsidiarity. 9 2 The same centrifugal force operating at the level of the 
European legal system giving rise to subsidiarity also spawned the creation of 
the Committee of the Regions and clarification and further elaboration of the 
principle of subsidiarity through the Protocol of Edinburgh. 9 3 Nonetheless, it 
91. See Koen LENAERTS, Constitutionalism and the Many Faces of Federalism, 
38 AM. J. COMP. L. 205, 210 (1990) ("At this time there is no doubt about the 
constitutional character of the Treaties of the European Communities."). 
92. The principle of subsidiarity can be the basis for a judicial "challenge against a 
Community act in violation of that principle," according to Araceli Mangas Martín 
and Diejo J. Liñan Nogueras. See INSTITUCIONES Y DERECHO D E LA UNIÓN EUROPEA 
49 (2d ed. 1999) ("impugnación de un acto comunitario que violase dicho principio"). 
Other authors, on the other hand, including a then sitting judge of the Court of First 
Instance of the European Communities, depreciate the principle of subsidiarity. See 
Koen Lenaerts, The Principle of Subsidiarity and the Environment in the European 
Union: Keeping the Balance of Federalism, 17 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 846, 893 (1994) 
(arguing that the then new principle of subsidiarity does not function as a 
constitutional norm dividing powers among the State Members of the European 
Community and the Community, but is rather a "political principle, a kind of rule of 
reason," guiding the exercise of their powers by Community institutions). 
93. See MANGAS MARTÍN & LIÑAN NOGUERO, ibid., 48-49; y Jaime RODRÍGUEZ-
ARANA, Sobre el Principio de Subsidiariedad, XVII JORNADAS D E ESTUDIO: VOL. 1, 
LA CONSTITUCIÓN ESPAÑOLA EN EL ORDENAMIENTO JURÍDICO COMUNITARIO EUROPEO 
(II) 749, 772 (1998). These authors argue that the scope of subsidiarity reaches the 
relationship between the European Communities and the regions of of Europe, 
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is highly doubtful that subsidiarity could operate to protect the autonomy of 
regions or, in Spain's case, its Autonomous Communities from the transfer of 
authority from a Member State to the institutions of the EU. Moreover, it is 
even doubtful that the principle of subsidiarity applies to the relationship 
between the EU and the regions of Europe themselves. 9 4 Indeed, it is clear 
that regions lack jus standi before the European Court of Justice, except as 
mere private legal persons who, as such, are not entitled to invoke the 
principle of subsidiarity when they appear before the Court of Justice. 9 5 Even 
if it were possible to construct some mode of protection based on subsidiarity 
for Europe's regions through the European Court of Justice, it would be 
doubtful whether such protection could affect the scope of the concept of 
autonomy established under Spain's own Constitution, for it appears settled 
that without constitutional amendment the law of the EU could not transgress 
certain basic limits established by Spain's legal order. 9 6 And what are those 
limits? In order to understand the limits of autonomy and how they may 
be shaped, it might be useful to focus on the apparent tension in Spain's 
Constitution between the "indissoluble unity of the Spanish nation" 9 7 and the 
including perhaps the Autonomous Communities of Spain. See MANGAS MARTÍN & 
LlÑAN Noguera, ibid., 48. 
94. See José Manuel SOBRINO HEREDIA, Introducción, in LA ACCIÓN EXTERIOR DE 
LAS COMUNIDADES AUTÓNOMAS: ESPECIAL REFERENCIA A GALICIA 43 (2001)(referring 
to the rejection of the opinion of the Committee on the Regions which had proposed 
the revision of the Treaty of Maastricht so as to apply subsidiarity in this case). 
95. See Manuel FRAGA IRIBARNE, Prologo, in LA ACCIÓN EXTERIOR DE LAS 
COMUNIDADES AUTÓNOMAS: ESPECIAL REFERENCIA A GALICIA 15 (2001)(arguing for 
jus standi). 
96. According to Mangas Martín and Liñan Noguera: "The limits, which are very 
difficult to breach, of the current Constitution, may be found in a attribution of 
sovereighnty that would place in peril the survivial of the very Constitution and the 
State itself, affecting its essential elements such as its character as social and 
democratic state (political and labor pluralisms, the rule of law), national unity, an 
official common language, the system of autonomy, the constitutional structure of 
pulic power, the monarchical form of the State, and respect for the fundamental rights 
and liberties recognized in Title I." Op. cit., 266-67 (analyzing the Judgment of the 
Constitutional Tribunal concerning the Treaty of Maastricht, July 1, 1992, see BOE, 
July 24, 1992) ("Los limites, muy difíciles de franquear en la vigente Constitución, se 
encontrarían en una atribución de soberanía que pusiera en peligro la pervivencia de la 
propia Constitución y del Estado mismo, afectando a sus elementos esenciales 
como son el Estado social y democrático (pluralismo político y sindica, imperio del 
Derecho), la unidad nacional, la lengua común oficial, el sistema autonómico, la 
estructura constitucional de los poderes públicos, la forma monárquica del Estado y el 
respeto a los derechos y libertadas fundamentales reconocidas en el Titulo I"). 
97. Ibid., Article 2 ("la indissoluble unidad de la Nación española").. 
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potentially competing principle of the putative superior value of "political 
pluralism." 9 8 
On one hand, clearly the "unity of the nation," according to Article 2 of 
the Constitution, "recognizes" at the same time "the right to autonomy of all 
the nationalities and regions that together form Spain and to solidarity among 
all of them." 9 9 One must note that, just as according to the text of Article 2, 
the "unity of the nation" is deemed to pre-date the Constitution, one could 
also say that the "nationalities and regions" are also deemed to be preexisting 
entities, a thesis supported not only by the text of Article 2 but also by the 
Primera Disposición Adicional appended to the Constitution, which provides 
that the Constitution "shall protect and respect the historic rights of the the 
foral territories." 1 0 0 Following this line of analysis, José Luis Mielan Gil, the 
Rector of the University of A Coruña, argues for a point of departure for 
constitutional analysis in which Spain, as a country in existence prior to its 
most recent Constitution, finds its roots in a history linked to the so-called 
foral rights and in which the Church played a significant role, thus implying 
that the Constitution of this complex state ought to be interpreted in 
accordance with that history. 1 0 1 Accordingly, he argues that this implies that 
the Constitutional Tribunal ought to protect the autonomy of the successor 
institutions to Spain's "territories" in a way that would sustain their identity 
as entities with their own histories. Arguably, the Constitutional Tribunal 
could undertake this structural responsibility even when the governments of 
the Autonomous Communities might appear to have waived their core rights 
to autonomy and the preservation of their historic distinctiveness. 1 0 2 If so, the 
98. The Constitution of Spain, Article 1.1. 
99. Ibid., The Constitution of Spain, Article 2 ("reconoce ... el derecho a la 
autonomía de las nacionalidades y regiones que la integran y la solidaridad entre todas 
ellas"). 
100. The Constitution of Spain, Primera Disposición Adicional ("ampara y respeta 
los derechos históricos de los territorios forales"). 
101. See José Luis MEILÁN GIL: El fundamento constitucional del pluralismo 
autonómico, in EUROPA, Galicia: La Religión como elemento impulsor de la 
ideología nacionalista 257, 262-63 (Gloria Moran ed. 1997). 
102. See generally IVÁN IBAN: op. cit., 144-45. Iban observes that the legislative 
organs of the Autonomous Communities promulgate compilations of so-called "foral" 
laws with identical content, demonstrating that "the authority for these laws 
is autonomic and not national" yet "the Autonomous Communities have in the end 
suppressed foral law, which had survived even in periods of the sharpest 
centralization." Ibid, ("que la fuerza normativa es autonómica y no nacional", tal que 
"las comunidades autónomas han concluido por suprimir el Derecho foral, que resistió 
en los momentos de más agudo centralismo"). 
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Constitutional Tribunal perhaps then could follow a line of analysis pursued 
by the U.S. Supreme Court by which it does not permit the States of the 
United States to abandon their own sovereignty even when their putative 
tribunes in the federal Senate would have renounced those protections. 1 0 3 
On the other hand, the self-governance rights of the autonomous 
communities are arguably linked, at least according to the text of Article 2, 
with solidarity with the other autonomous communities and with the State, 
thus requiring that all territorially-based entities participate cooperatively in 
the life of the nation and of the other regions of Spain. Moreover, the object 
of the Constitution, including the its Primera Disposición Adicional, arguably 
is not the specific historical configurations established in the so-called "foral 
laws." This conclusion is grounded on the defeat in the Senado during the 
constitutional drafting process of a proposed amendment referring specifically 
to these historic r igh ts . 1 0 4 Thus, one could suppose that it is, indeed, the 
principle of solidarity that supplies content to the constitutionally-prescribed 
superior value of political pluralism; in fact, political pluralism in this sense 
has been understood as a background philosophic matter as merely linking the 
two chief elements of democracy - the participation of all in political life, and 
tolerance for fundamentally different points of v i e w . 1 0 5 Indeed, De Esteban 
and González-Trevijano go so far as to argue that political pluralism as a 
value is limited to Articles 6 and 7 of the Constitution, which refer only 
to political parties and labor un ions . 1 0 6 By contrast, they argue, the 
"indivisibility" of the nation "precedes the Constitution itself, and it follows 
that the Spanish Constitution does not grant the right of self-determination to 
the peoples composing i t . " 1 0 7 This narrow view of the constitutional 
requirement of political pluralism might then suggest that the right of Spain's 
autonomous communities to express their own identity in a way that is not in 
103. See, supra, text accompanying notes 44 - 52. 
104. See JORGE DE ESTEBAN y PEDRO J. GONZÁLEZ-TREVIJANO, Curso de Derecho 
Constitucional Español I, 95-96 (1992). In addition, the Disposición Derogatoria of 
the Constitution specifically set aside the Royal Decree of October 25, 1839 
conferring so-called foral rights to the Basque Provinces. See ibid., 128-29. 
105. See Milagros OTERO PARGA: Valores Constitucionales: Introducción a la 
Filosofía del Derecho: axiológica jurídica 133-65 (1999). 
106. See DE ESTEBAN y GONZÁLEZ-TREVIJANO, op. cit., 95 (referring specifically 
to articles 6 and 7). 
107. Ibid., 133 ("es también previa a la propia norma constitucional y que, por 
consiguiente, la Constitución española no admite el derecho de autodeterminación de 
los pueblos que le componen"). 
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harmony with the identity of the other regions of Spain depends entirely on 
the political judgments of the political parties who happen to rule at any given 
moment, a conclusion which is reinforced by the broadest possible reading of 
the discretion committed by Spain's Constitution to the Cortes Generales . 1 0 8 
Limits on the Cortes Generales' discretion operate merely as a political, 
rather than a juridical, mode of protection, relying principally on the Senado; 
indeed, it may be similar to the mere "political safeguards of federalism" 
approach from which the U.S. Supreme Court apparently has now begun to 
re t reat . 1 0 9 
Is it possible, then, that the Constitutional Tribunal as supreme 
interpreter of the Spanish Constitution could, without validating a right of 
secession, compensate for its broad reading of the harmonization power of the 
central state? Could it fill gaps in the Constitution by resorting to principles 
similar to those of the new U.S. federalism reflected in the U.S. Supreme 
Court's most recent jurisprudence? This might be difficult, for U.S. 
federalism is based not only on the division of powers, which not even 
subsidiarity has been deemed to establish under EU l a w , 1 1 0 but also on a 
division of sovereignty, the so-called imperium in imperio, which Spanish and 
continental legal doctrine considers a logical contradiction. In this connection, 
if one employed political pluralism as the vehicle for constructing the legal 
relationship between individuals or groups with different political identities, 
one would need to note that both Spaniards and Americans enjoy two 
different citizenships. The difference, however, is that while a U.S. citizen is 
also a citizen of one of the states composing the United States, a Spanish 
citizen enjoys EU citizenship but does not have a relationship defined in 
terms of citizenship with an autonomous community. 
It is possible, as this article will now argue, that the different trajectories 
of the jurisprudence of the U.S. Supreme Court and Spain's Constitutional 
Tribunal relating to the external activities of the U.S. states and Spain's 
autonomous communities is connected to this central difference. Nonetheless, 
as this article will also argue, both courts may be moving in the same general 
direction in adapting their respective doctrines of federalism and autonomy to 
108. See The Constitution of Spain, Article 150.3. 
109. See, supra, text accompanying notes 44 - 52.. 
110. See Milagros OTERO PARGA: Algunos Aspectos de La División de Poderes y 
de su Aplicación en el Ordenamiento Jurídico Europeo, XVII Jornadas De Estudio: 
Vol. 1, La Constitución Española en el Ordenamiento Jurídico Comunitario Europeo 
(II) 667, 683-84 (1998). 
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assure to some degree the right of these sub-state entities to protect their 
respective sovereignty and interests. Indeed, the Spanish Constitutional 
Tribunal, rather than relying on doctrinal approaches, is making surprisingly 
effective use of common-law techniques in constitutional adjudication, 
suggesting an appropriate reticence to prescribe outcomes that, given the U.S. 
experience, may better be addressed through the political process. 
III. THE EXTERNAL ACTION OF SUB-STATE ENTITIES: RIGIDITY AND 
FLEXIBILITY IN FEDERALISM AND AUTONOMY 
With respect to the sovereignty of states of the U.S. and the autonomy of 
the autonomous communities of Spain, the division of authority with the 
central state in external affairs is implicated in two types of activities. The 
first is the typical case of an international treaty concluded by the central 
state. The second is the more unusual case of an activity by the sub-state 
entity having effects outside the nation as a whole. This section will employ 
case law analysis to demonstrate how the Supreme Court and Constitutional 
Tribunal have transformed doctrine governing the relationship between the 
central state and the sub-state entities, albeit through legal tools based on 
fundamentally different conceptions of the basis for the allocation of authority 
—federalism as a principle of political competition and autonomy as 
grounded in cooperative solidarity to advance the general interest. 
A. The Decline and Rise of Dual Sovereignty 
The development of the historic limits of the federal power over inter-
state commerce is crucial background for understanding the Supreme Court's 
jurisprudence concerning the external action of the states and the supposed 
federal exclusivity in this area. After World War I, the Supreme Court was 
required to decide if the federal government had violated the Constitution by 
entering into a treaty with Canada for the protection of migratory birds. 
Before the conclusion of the treaty, following the Commerce Clause 
jurisprudence of the period, lower federal courts had concluded that a federal 
law purporting to regulate birds migrating across state boundaries violated the 
Constitution, in part because there was no direct effect on inter-state 
commerce. Writing for the Court in Missouri v. Holland, Justice Oliver 
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Wendell Holmes set aside for purposes of his analysis the question whether 
Congress could by means of a normal law regulate in this area. Then Holmes, 
who had fought in the American Civil War 60 years earlier in defense of the 
idea that the American states were one nation, asserted that the federal power 
to enter into a so-called constitutional treaty —that is, one concluded by the 
federal executive with the "advice and consent" of two-thirds of the Senate, 
rather than mere legislative authorization or sole executive action— invoked 
external powers of sovereignty which necessarily implied correlative internal 
regulatory powers for the federal government. According to Justice Holmes, 
any constitutional limits on the federal power over inter-state commerce, 
whether through internal limits drawn from the constitutional text itself or 
external limits derived from the 10th Amendment, did not operate in the same 
way in a case involving foreign relations. 1 1 1 Nonetheless, one should observe 
that if, as it was later understood, the ordinary Commerce Clause embraced 
the regulatory authority exercised in that case, Holmes' broader theory 
concerning the expansion of federal internal powers to match the needs of 
external sovereignty would have been unnecessary to explain the result of the 
case; indeed, that even Holmes thought his statements could be mere dictum, 
rather than necessary legal reasoning, is suggested when Holmes merely 
supposed for purposes of analysis, and did not supply reasoning that would 
explain, that federal power in the case could not be grounded on the 
Commerce Clause alone. 
In the years before World War II, Justice Sutherland in United States v. 
Curtiss-Wright Export Corp. gave birth to a new, even broader, thesis 
concerning the origin of federal foreign affairs powers, which in that case 
modified the internal separation of powers between the legislative and 
executive branches of the federal government but is nonetheless also 
significant for the doctrine of federalism. Justice Sutherland found that the 
federal legislative power, which could not ordinarily in the circumstances of 
the case be delegated to the federal executive, could nonetheless be delegated 
in the context of regulatory action in pursuit of foreign policy goals. Justice 
Sutherland's thesis was that the powers of external sovereignty of the United 
States included among them powers which could not be grounded in the text 
of the Constitution, because every State member of the international 
community of necessity was entitled to exercise all the powers of external 
sovereignty in order to protect that state's interests. Justice Sutherland 
asserted that the responsibility for preventing U.S. exports of arms 
111. See Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920). 
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to warring South American countries should be exercised by the President 
—who, according to John Marshall's famous statement to the House of 
Representatives, was "the sole organ of the United States" in foreign affairs— 
upon his determination, as provided in a statute enacted by Congress, that 
such arms exports would risk continuing the war and thereby in effect 
threaten U.S. foreign policy interests. Thus, concluded Justice Sutherland, a 
person violating the export prohibition that entered in force only upon 
the President's determination, as that authority was delegated to him by 
Congress, was prosecuted and convicted in accordance with properly enacted 
law and, therefore, in accordance with constitutionally-guaranteed due 
process r igh t s . 1 1 2 
Be that as it may, the extraordinary constitutional powers identified in 
Missouri v. Holland and United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp. 
appeared to be put to rest in Reid v. Covert, at least with respect to their 
potential impact on the exercise of the fundamental individual rights protected 
by the amendments to the Constitution, collectively known as the "Bill of 
Rights" of the United Sta tes . 1 1 3 Reaching the holding that a civilian 
dependent on a member of the military deployed in Germany pursuant to 
treaty was constitutionally-entitled to a U.S. civil trial rather than a court-
martial, notwithstanding jurisdiction granted by the treaty to the U.S. military, 
for a crime allegedly committed in Germany, a plurality of the members of 
the Court concluded that Missouri v. Holland and United States v. Curtiss-
Wright Export Corp. did not control. Justice Holmes had based the theory of 
an extraordinary federal treaty powers he articulated in Missouri v. Holland 
on constitutional text providing that, while all laws "pursuant to" the 
Constitution were part of the supreme law of the U.S. binding on the states 
and superior to all earlier enacted federal law, any treaties made under the 
"authority of the United States" would also enjoy this supremacy. This 
suggested to Justice Holmes that treaties, even if not pursuant to the 
Constitution, would operate as superior law notwithstanding any 
inconsistencies with the constitutional protection of state sovereignty either in 
the internal limits of the enumerated powers or the external limits imposed by 
112. See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 3 0 4 (1936). 
113. See Reid v. Covert, 3 5 4 U.S. 1 (1954). Only a plurality of the justices in this 
case thought it necessary to reach this conclusion to sustain to the result, although 
subsequently the Supreme Court has followed the plurality opinion as though it were 
settled doctrine. See TRIBE: op. cit., 647 n. 19 (citing Boos v. Barry, 4 8 5 U.S. 313 , 3 2 4 
(1988)) . 
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the 10th Amendment . 1 1 4 Yet Justice Holmes' reasoning also permitted the 
inference that treaties need not be bound by other limitations, including 
perhaps even the Bill of Rights, imposed by the Constitution. Justice Black in 
Reid v. Covert explained that Holmes had not realized that the distinction 
drawn in the Constitution between laws and treaties was intended solely to 
ensure that the earlier treaties of the United States, including even the Treaty 
of Paris ending the Revolutionary War against England, would continue to 
bind the states. Indeed, inclusion of this clause reflected the chief motivation 
for the assembly of the Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia in 1787 
to replace the first Constitution of the United States, the Articles of 
Confederation. 1 1 5 At the same time, Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer 
in the related area of separation of powers seemed to ignore completely the 
teaching of United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export. The Court reasoned 
instead in terms of all of the facts and circumstances, including the degree of 
explicitness in Congressional authorization and the level of impact on 
domestic activities and rights, to hold that the national interest in the 
continued production of steel during the U.N.-authorized police action in 
Korea undertaken by U.S. military forces could not in the absence of explicit 
Congressional authorization justify federal executive seizure of the steel mills 
whose production was impeded by labor s t r i fe . 1 1 6 In sum, two lines of 
precedent compete for constitutional hegemony, giving the Court some 
degree of discretion in the management of future cases. 
Similarly, with respect to the question of the external activities of states, 
precedents flow in different directions, and demarcating the boundary 
between state and federal power is as difficult as in the case of the internal 
effects of federal foreign policy-based action. On one hand, the so-called 
Dormant Commerce Clause —that is to say, the doctrine that the Federal 
Commerce Clause by itself bars the states from infringing the federal 
common market— applies even more vigorously with respect to the foreign 
commerce of the United States, where the capacity of the United States to 
function as one entity is even more seriously at risk, than in the case of purely 
114. See Missouri v. Holland, op. cit., 433. Article V I , section 2 of the U.S. 
Constitution provides: "This Constitution, and the laws of the United states which 
shall be made in Purusance thereof, and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, 
under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and 
the Jjudges of every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or the 
Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding." 
115. See Reid v. Covert, op cit., 16. 
116. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952). 
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internal commerce . 1 1 7 Moreover, during the Cold War the Supreme Court 
found it necessary to construct an additional free-floating doctrine adding 
even to the already significant limits imposed by the Dormant Commerce 
Clause on the activities of states that could affect the foreign affairs of the 
United States. In Zschernig v. Miller the Supreme Court decided that, 
although a state's conditioning of rights of inheritance of a foreign national on 
a right to reciprocal treatment for a similarly-situated U.S. national under the 
law of that foreign State was constitutional, a state court judge's invidious 
characterization of Eastern European Communist country's inheritance law 
applied that statute unconstitutionally, specifically in violation of the implied 
federal exclusivity in the conduct of the foreign relations of the United 
S ta tes . 1 1 8 Although the Court had previously decided that state statutes of this 
kind did not violate the Constitution, and although the federal Executive 
branch publicly maintained that the state court judge's comments did not 
impede the foreign policy of the United States, the Supreme Court decided 
nonetheless that under the particular facts of the case the state judiciary's 
airing of such views invaded powers of the political branch of the federal 
government central to the management of the Cold W a r . 1 1 9 Notably, because 
the Supreme Court emphasized the particular facts of the case it is difficult to 
determine the degree to which Zschernig v. Miller will operate as precedent, 
although it clearly represents the outer perimeter of protection for federal 
authority through the limitation of state activity having potential effects on 
U.S. foreign policy interests only tangentially, if at all, related to the foreign 
commerce of the United States. 
On the other hand, a narrower interpretation of federal exclusivity is 
available. Recently, the Supreme Court evaded the question of Zschernig v. 
Miller's continued strength as a precedent. In Crosby v. National Foreign 
Trade Council, rather than rely on an implied federal exclusivity in foreign 
relations, the Court, to invalidate state conduct, decided on the narrower 
ground of federal preemption of any state conduct on the basis of a federal 
statute delegating broad discretion to the president with respect to a particular 
issue to advance the foreign policy interests of the United S ta tes 1 2 0 . Before 
117. See South-Central Timber Development, Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S.482 
(1984) (holding that the state of Alaska as a seller of its own timber resources could 
not require in-state processing of that lumber after transferring title to a third party). 
118. See Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429 (1968). 
119. See ibid., 434. 
120. See Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363 (2000). 
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determining the applicability of the potentially broad Dormant Commerce 
Clause or the potentially even broader doctrine of Zschernig v. Miller, the 
Court first sought to interpret the federal statute authorizing the President to 
impose specific limitations on investment and other trade with Myanmar, 
thought by the U.S. Congress to be a dictatorship violating the rights of its 
citizens. Indeed, this viewed was shared by many U.S. state governments, 
including the government of Massachusetts, whose boycott of companies 
investing in, or otherwise doing business with, Myanmar was intended to 
encourage the government of Myanmar to restore civil liberties. Although the 
text of the federal statute did not indicate precisely that Congress intended to 
prohibit state sanctions, the Court nonetheless concluded that any degree of 
state discretion in this area was incompatible with the degree of discretion 
granted by the Congress to the President to enable him to develop and 
implement a policy capable of achieving the goals of the Congress. It its 
interpretation of the statute, moreover, the Court declined to apply the so-
called "anti-preemption presumption" —that is to say, normally in the 
absence of a conflict with the specific provisions of a federal statute or a clear 
expression in the statute to displace state law, a federal statute is to be 
interpreted to the maximum extent possible so as not to conflict with state 
l a w . 1 2 1 Rather, according to the Court, Congress's intention was so clearly 
inferable from its ample grant of discretion to the President that it was 
unnecessary to reach the question of the applicability of the presumption in 
the context of matters relating to foreign pol icy . 1 2 2 Interestingly, the Court's 
focus on the discretion accorded to the President and the correlative need for 
the states to remove themselves from the field suggests overtones of the 
Supreme Court's emphasis on political accountability in its New York and 
Printz opinions. 
121. See Mintz v. Baldwin, 289 U.S. 346, 350 (1933) (the so-called "presumption 
against preemption"). 
122. See Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council, op. cit., 374 n. 8 (citing 
United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89 (2000)). It is perhaps notable that the Supreme 
Court, interpreting a federal statute designed to regulate maritime commerce as 
applied to state's interests in the protection of its maritime environment, held that the 
traditional presumption against preemption was inapplicable, because maritime issues 
historically, indeed since the very beginnings of the republic, had been regulated by 
the federal government rather than the states. See U.S. v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89, 108 
(2000). This analysis may well be comparable to the historically-based strand of the 
reasoning the Court employed in National League of Cities v. Usery and U.S. v. 
Morrison. See, supra, text accompanying notes 46 - 50 and 69 - 77. 
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In sum, one should observe that Justice Sutherland's approach, giving 
the states practically no role in the conduct of foreign affairs, may be in 
tension with the views of the Justices now spearheading a revival of 
federalism through the protection of political competition between the federal 
government and the states and the reconstruction of limits on the federal 
authority over inter-state and foreign commerce. In U.S. Term Limits, the 
same justices who helped to form a majority in New York, Printz, Lopez and 
Morrison declared that the powers reserved to the states under the 10th 
Amendment included any and all powers that did not form part of the 
enumerated powers of the federal government. 1 2 3 It is quite possible that 
Missouri v. Holland and Curtiss-Wright Export Corp. represent a temporary 
response by the Supreme Court to allow the federal government to defend the 
interests of a nation that had unexpectedly become a world power, a view 
advanced by at least one student of the history of the powers of the U.S. states 
in the 19th century . 1 2 4 When Supreme Court chose to decide Crosby on 
the narrowest possible ground and, in so doing, emphasized presidential 
discretion and accountability, it may have foreshadowed future resort as a 
matter of constitutional law to the new internal allocation of competence 
between the states and the federal government based on reinforcing political 
accountability to further political competition. The Court's opinion thus 
leaves open the possibility of constructing an approach that will also vindicate 
a right of the people to further their foreign affairs interests through both the 
federal government and, to the extent practicable, through the states. 
B. The Road From Denmark to Brussels 
Like the Supreme Court of the United States, the Constitutional Tribunal 
of Spain has had to confront the question of the effect of a treaty on the 
internal distribution of competence between the central state and the sub-state 
123. See U.S. Term Limits v. Thornton, op. cit., 845 (Justice Thomas, writing in 
dissent also for Justices Rehnquest, OXonnor, and Scalia). In addition, one should 
note that Justice Kennedy, although joining the majority in U.S. Term Limits, wrote 
separately to emphasize his own support for the protection of state sovereignty as well, 
thereby suggesting a more equivocal position on the scope of the powers reserved to 
the states by principles of federalism and the 10th amendment to the Constitution. See 
ibid., 836. 
124. See G. EDWARD WHITE: The Transformation of the Constitutional Regime of 
Foreign Relations, 85 Va. L. Rev. 1 (1999). 
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entities. The premises for the Tribunal's analysis with respect to the effect 
of Spain's entry into the EEC on this allocation of competence were 
explicated in Comercio de Carnes along the following lines: "The necessity 
for collaboration between the central administration and the autonomous 
administrations derives as much from the need for systematic interpretation of 
the Constitution as from the Constitution's supremacy over the Statutes of 
Autonomy, a collaboration which demands in many cases, above all with 
respect to our admission to the EEC, forms of articulation (for example, 
implementation of tasks for which the State is responsible instead by the 
Autonomous Administrations and, therefore but only to that extent, in 
accordance with the direction and supervision of the Central Administration) 
which only an inadequate interpretation of the statutes on autonomy and 
constitutional precepts could obstruct." 1 2 5 Arguably, then, the Constitutional 
Tribunal emphasized solidarity and cooperation between the state and 
autonomous communities in furthering the imperative project of Spain's 
integration into the EEC, thereby suggesting that the settled doctrinal position 
that core elements of the Spanish Constitution, such as autonomy, should be 
subordinated to the project of developing a "systematic interpretation" of the 
Constitution that could further the goal of European integration. 
One might argue, however, that the Constitutional Tribunal's opinion in 
Comercio de Carnes includes language suggesting, to the contrary, that the 
allocation of competence between the state and the autonomous communities 
would survive the treaty. Addressing the claim of the lawyer for the State that 
EEC directives provided for "the direct and exclusive exercise of authority by 
the Central Administration" of certain measures, the Tribunal replied as 
follows: "It is, consequently, the internal rules delimiting competence that 
125. Judgment of the Constitutional Tribunal, No. 252/88, Dec. 20,1988, Case on 
Comercio de Carnes, fund. jur. no. 2. See also ibid., fund. jur. no. 3 ("Tanto de la 
interpretación «ifómática de la Constitución como de la supremacía de esta sobre los 
Estatutos se deriva la necesidad de colaboración entre la Administración Central y las 
Administraciones Autonómicas, colaboración que puede exigir en muchos casos, en 
relación sobre todo, con nuestra incorporación a la CEE, formas de articulación (por 
ejemplo, realización por la Administración Autonómica de tareas de competencia esta-
tal, con sumisión en consecuencia, y solo en cuanto a ellas, a instrucción y supervisión 
de la Administración Central) que solo una interpretación inadecuada de los preceptos 
constitucionales y estatutarios puede obstaculizar"). The Tribunal referred to the 
"aforementioned general principle of collaboration repeatedly to referred to by the 
Tribunal as a criterion informing the relations between the State and the Autonomous 
Communities." Ibid, ("principio general de colaboración antes aludido y que repetida-
mente se ha referido este Tribunal como criterio informador de las relaciones entre el 
Estado y las Comunidades Autónomas"). 
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must in all cases form the basis of an answer to the conflicts of authority 
between the State and the Autonomous Communities." By parity of 
reasoning, added the Tribunal, the autonomous communities, "for this very 
same reason, should not consider their own powers expanded beyond their 
proper scope because of an international connection." 1 2 6 One must note, 
nonetheless, that this reply was based on the premise that EEC Directives 
"limit themselves to specifying the authorities of each of the State Members 
of the EEC without prejudice therefore as to which Administration —the 
State or Autonomous Community— is competent to receive that authority and 
stand watch over the maintenance of the envisioned situation. The only 
thing the Directives impose at this point, in sum, is that the Central 
Administration be the only spokesman to the EEC with respect to compliance 
with Community determinations, but this is an exigency which, as is well 
understood, may be satisfied through various formulas and means, rather 
than, as we are given to believe by the lawyer for the State, only through the 
direct and exclusive exercise of these representative capacities by the 
Administration of the S ta te . " 1 2 7 Thus, despite language suggesting the 
contrary, it appears clear that the Tribunal's opinion actually holds only that 
the allocation of competence between the State and the Autonomous 
Communities is not necessarily affected if compliance with the EEC Treaty 
does not require a change in the internal legal order. Thus understood, the 
opinion merely interprets the means employed by the central government to 
comply with Spain's obligations to the Community. The only necessary 
central state monopoly of competence, according to the Tribunal, was that 
only the central state can be the point of contact between Spain and the 
126. See ibid., fund. jur. no. 2 ("Son, en consecuencia, las reglas internas de 
delimitación competencial las que en todo caso han de fundamentar la respuesta a los 
conflictos de competencia planteados entre el Estado y las Comunidades Autónomas, 
las cuales, por esta misma razón tampoco podrían considerar ampliado su propio 
ámbito competencial en virtud de una conexión internacional"). 
127. See ibid, ("se limitan a precisar que son las autoridades centrales de cada 
uno de los Estados miembros de la CEE... sin prejuzgar, por consiguiente, cuál deba 
ser la Administración competente —si la estatal o la autonómica— para la concesión 
de dichas autorizaciones y para velar por el mantenimiento de las condiciones pre-
vistas. Lo único que las Directivas imponen en este punto es, en suma, que la Admi-
nistración Central sea el interlocutor único de la CEE en lo que toca al efectivo 
cumplimiento de las determinaciones comunitarias, pero ésta es una exigencia que, 
como bien se comprende, podría ser satisfecha a través de fórmulas y expedientes 
diversos, y no solo, frente a lo que da a entender el Abogado del Estado, mediante el 
ejercicio directo y exclusivo por la Administración del Estado de las intervenciones 
dichas"). 
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Community with respect the "fulfillment of Community determinations," 
which left open the possibility that the Autonomous Communities could in 
principle engage in contacts with other governments or the EEC unrelated to 
the fulfillment of Community obligations. 
In subsequent opinions, the Tribunal clarified these themes, although 
neither its language in Comercio de Carnes nor in the contemporaneous 
case Acuerdo Galicia-Dinamarca128 foreshadowed what appeared to be a 
doctrinal turn in Oficina Vasca en Bruselas.129 One should note that the kind 
of international law involved in Comercio de Carnes originated, not in a mere 
international treaty, but rather in the EEC —thereby implicating Article 93 
of Spain's Constitution. This provision enables the central state by treaty 
to transfer to an "international organization or institution the exercise of 
competences derived from the Constitution" and "guarantees fulfillment of 
these treaties and resolutions of international or supranational organizations 
receiving such grants of authority " 1 3 ° Accordingly, the internal distribution 
of competence concerning the function of representing the country in respect 
of its international obligations also presupposed that the competence to 
conclude the treaty was also held exclusively by the central state. The 
Constitutional Tribunal, in Acuerdo Galicia-Dinamarca, expressly affirmed 
this implicit premise embedded in Comercio de Carnes. However, although it 
framed the issue of the case as whether the Constitution "eliminated root and 
branch any form of ius contrahendi for the autonomous enti t ies," 1 3 1 in the 
following paragraph the Tribunal noted merely that the autonomous 
communities lacked the competence to enter into t reat ies . 1 3 2 It based its 
conclusions on the text of the Constitution, citing the exclusive competence of 
the central state with respect to "international relat ions," 1 3 3 although it made 
128. See Judgment of the Constitutional Tribunal, No. 137/89, July 20, 1989, 
Case on Comunicado de Colaboración suscrito el 2 de noviembre de 1984 entre el 
Consejero de Ordenación de la Junta de Galicia y la Dirección de Medio Ambiente 
del Gobierno del Reino de Dinamarca [Galicia-Dinamarca Agreement]. 
129. See Judgment of the Constitutional Tribunal, No. 165/95, May 26, 1994 
[Oficina Vasca en Bruselas]. 
130. See Constitution of Spain, Article 93 ("organización o institución interna-
cional ejercicio de competencias derivadas de la Constitución" and "garantía del 
cumplimiento de estos tratados y de las resoluciones de los organismos internacionales 
o supranacional titulares de las cesiones"). 
131. See ibid., fund. jur. no. 3 ("elimina de raíz cualquiera forma de ius 
contrahendi de los entes autonómicos ) (emphasis added). 
132. See ibid., fund. jur. no. 4. 
133. See Constitution of Spain, Article 149. 1.3. 
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clear that its interpretation was not of the text "considered in isolation, but 
rather as it was grounded in, and confirmed by, other Constitutional precepts, 
in the text's drafting history, and in the legislature's practical construction of 
the constitutional text in the drafting of the Statutes of Autonomy." 1 3 4 Thus, 
the Tribunal signaled its intention to avoid formalistic analysis and suggested 
that it might be open, at least in theory, to the possibility of permitting the 
autonomous communities to engage in some kinds of contacts —perhaps 
including even contracts not operating as treaties under international law yet 
establishing rights and duties under municipal law— with such international 
entities as other sub-state entities, states, and international or supranational 
organizations. 
This possibility for a more open-textured approach in interpreting the 
external capacities of the autonomous communities may have been realized in 
the Constitutional Tribunal's opinion in Oficina Vasca en Brúcelas. The 
Tribunal clarified that exclusive central state competence over international 
relations, as provided under Article 149.1.3, could not be interpreted to 
prohibit any external action whatsoever by the autonomous communities. 
This conclusion was grounded on the view that, while the interests protected 
by the autonomous communities merited constitutional protection when they 
were not in conflict with the general interests of the community protected by 
the central state, the gravitational force of the European Union nonetheless 
could distort the autonomous communities' performance of their own 
functions. Indeed, noted the Tribunal, "it is evident that norms and acts of the 
European Communities may operate not only to limit and restrict the 
Autonomous Communities' exercise of their own competences, but also 
conversely to establish economic incentives and assistance for activities that 
the Autonomous Communities would then implement." 1 3 5 More important 
methodologically, and signaling a turn toward the use of the techniques 
developed by the Supreme Court of the United States to avoid the kind of 
134 See Acuerdo Galicia-Dinarmarca, op. cit., fund. jur. no. 4 ("aisladamente 
considerado, sino que encuentra asimismo fundamento y confirmación en otros 
preceptos de la Constitución, en los antecedentes de la elaboración de esta y en la 
interpretación efectuada al propósito por el legislador de los Estatutos de 
Autonomía"). 
135. See Oficina Vasca en Bruselas, op. cit., fund. jur. 4 ("es evidente que las 
normas y actos de las Comunidades Europeas pueden entrañar no solo limites y 
restricciones al ejercicio de las competencias que corresponden a las Comunidades 
Autónomas sino que también pueden establecer, a la inversa, incentivas y ayudas 
económicas para las actividades que estos entes llevan a cabo."). 
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"systematic interpretation" of the Spanish Constitution the Tribunal had 
earlier appeared to favor in Comercio de Carnes, the Tribunal now decided 
that the potential conflict between the Basque Autonomous Community's 
decision to open an office in Brussels to represent Basque interests before the 
EU and the exclusive responsibility of the central state in international 
relations could not be adjudicated in the absence of determinate facts 
allowing the Tribunal to assess whether the potential conflict had ripened into 
an actual conflict . 1 3 6 
Yet, Oficina Vasca en Brúcelas could be reconciled with Acuerdo 
Galicia-Dinamarca in at least two ways. First, the Tribunal emphasized the 
fact that, especially after the Treaty of Maastricht, "Europe had come to 
create a new legal order, the community legal order, that to the combination 
of states composing the European Communities could be considered as 
having certain internal effects." It thus added that "undoubtedly the 
Autonomous Communities have an interest in the development of the 
Community dimension." 1 3 7 This statement thus facilitates an interpretation of 
Oficina Vasca en Brúcelas that would limit its effect as a precedent only to 
the activities of the autonomous communities having an internal character 
because of their relation to the supranational EU. Therefore, one could argue 
it would not conflict with a broad reading of the Tribunal's opinion in 
Acuerdo Galicia-Dinamarca as precluding any purely international, non-EU 
activities of the autonomous communities. 
Second, and suggesting an even less significant retreat from the broadest 
reading of Acuerdo Galicia-Dinamarca, the Tribunal in Oficina Vasca en 
Brúcelas emphasized that its reasoning "equally excludes the possibility that 
the Autonomous Communities could establish permanent organs of 
representation before the Community institutions, endowed with international 
personality, because that would imply a prior agreement with the receiving 
State or international Organization in respect of which those organs 
would exercise their functions." 1 3 8 But, because Spain already had a prior 
136. See ibid., fund. jur. no. 8. 
137. See ibid., fund. jur. no. 4 ("Europa ha venido a crear un orden jurídico, el 
comunitario, que para el conjunto de los Estados componentes de las Comunidades 
Europeas puede considerarse a ciertos efectos como 'interno'... es indudable que [las 
Comunidades Autónomas] poseen un interés en el desarrollo de esa dimensión 
comunitaria."). 
138. See ibid., fund. jur. no. 5 ("excluye igualmente que dichos entes puedan 
establecer órganos permanentes de representación ante esos sujetos, dotados de un 
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agreement with the Community establishing Spain's right to diplomatic 
representation in Brussels, and because the Tribunal made clear that Basque 
Office was required to coordinate its legitimate informational activities with 
Spain's mission, the Basque Office did not necessarily create an agency 
purporting to exercise independently a portion of Spain's international 
rights. 1 3 9 Accordingly, the Constitutional Tribunal was not required to 
characterize the establishment of the Basque Office as an event requiring a 
prior international agreement and, therefore, its reasoning could be interpreted 
as not in conflict with the broad reading of Acuerdo Galicia-Dinamarca as 
prohibiting the autonomous communities from engaging in any kind of 
international activities, including entering into even agreements other than 
treaties and any kind of representational or informational activities of a 
diplomatic character. 
Setting aside the potential for a narrow interpretation of Oficina Vasca 
en Brúcelas, it is possible that a broad view of the rights of the autonomous 
communities to represent local interests within the European Union may be 
linked to the Treaty of Maastricht's creation of a new supranational 
citizenship for citizens of Spain. Indeed, this new European citizenship was 
approved by the Constitutional Tribunal, subject to the need for technical 
amendments to the Spanish Constitution to enable Spain to comply with its 
obligations to grant voting rights to all EU citizens, before the Treaty of 
Maastricht could enter into force in Spain. 1 4 0 As language in Oficina Vasca 
en Brúcelas suggests, this new supranational citizenship for inhabitants of 
Spain's Autonomous Communities may well give rise to a constitutionally-
significant interest in the protection of their local interests through the agency 
of the autonomous communities, whether acting in a merely representative 
capacity for citizens of Spain and the EU or on their own behalf as subjects of 
estatuto internacional pues ello implicara un previo acuerdo con el Estado receptor o la 
Organización internacional ante la que ejercen sus funciones."). 
139. See ibid., fund. jur. no. 8 ("the relations [of the Autonomous Communities] 
the responsibility for whose coordination is entrusted to the Office for Matters related 
to the European Communities are to those activities, of information and connection 
with respect to European institutions, that do not impinge upon responsibility for 
international relations reserved to the State") ("las relaciones [de las Comunidades 
Autónomas] cuya coordinación se encomienda al Gabinete para Asuntos relacionados 
con las Comunidades Europeas se refieren a aquellas actividades de información y 
conexión respecto de instituciones europeas que no inciden en el ámbito de las relacio-
nes internacionales reservadas al Estado") (internal quotes omitted). 
140. See Declaration of the Constitutional Tribunal concerning the Treaty of 
Maastricht, July 1, 1992, BOE, July 24, 1992. 
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EU law. Arguably, dual citizenship would provide the analytic key to the 
evolving jurisprudence of the Constitutional Tribunal concerning activities of 
the Autonomous Communities which, although once implicating the 
international relations boundary in the distribution of authority with the 
State, now could be analyzed solely in terms of the ordinary principles 
governing the conflict between general and local interests under the Spanish 
Constitution. Moreover, the domestic federalism principles of the United 
States, as recently elaborated by the Supreme Court in terms of reinforcing 
political competition between two competing sovereignties, might also inform 
the Constitutional Tribunal's continuing assessment of the role of the 
Autonomous Communities in helping to vindicate both the local and general 
interests of Spanish citizens in the context of political competition between 
the Spanish State and the European Union. 
Nonetheless, repeating in broad language the dictum of Acuerdo 
Galicia-Dinamarca, the Tribunal declared in Oficina Vasca en Brúcelas that 
the interests of the Autonomous Communities themselves could be expressed 
only to the extent they did not "implicate the exercise of ius contrahendi, did 
not entail immediate obligations to foreign public authorities, did not intrude 
on the foreign policy of the State, and did not give rise to responsibility for 
the State with respect to foreign states or international or supranational 
organizations."1 4 1 Thus, the Tribunal left open, as had the U.S. Supreme 
Court in Zschernig v. Miller and Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council, 
the possibility of controlling the external activities of Spain's sub-state 
entities if the conditions of international relations required the Tribunal to 
give more weight to the claim of the central government to protect the 
general, in this case the external, interests of the political community rather 
than to the demand of sub-state entities to represent local interests before 
authorities managing powers now allocated to the EU. Indeed, while U.S. 
federalism may be less relevant to Spain's constitutional allocation of internal 
sovereignty, exploring the U.S. experience —in particular, the room for 
growth U.S. jurisprudence has left open for itself in the allocation of 
competence over questions of external sovereignty— may well yield insights 
141. See Oficina Vasca en Bruselas, op. cit., fund. jur. no. 6 ("no impliquen el 
ejercicio de un ius contrahendi, no originen obligaciones inmediatas y actuales frente 
a poderes públicos extranjeros, no incidan en la política exterior del Estado, y no 
generen responsabilidad de éste frente a Estados extranjeros u organizaciones inter o 
supranacionales").. 
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that could reveal and inform new lines of analysis for the nascent Spanish 
constitutional experience. 1 4 2 
IV. CONCLUSIONS: THE ROLE OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IN 
FACILITATING THE CREATION OF NEW INTERNATIONAL LAW 
The economic and political tendencies for regional, and global, 
integration impose centripetal and centrifugal stresses on domestic 
constitutional systems, although perhaps most severely for complex states 
such as the United States and Spain. The evolution of their constitutions must 
take into account two elements that are sometimes in opposition. At one 
extreme, it is necessary for the central government to retain the discretion 
necessary to defend the most important interests of the people to whom that 
government is responsible. These interests in peace and security are of the 
greatest value when they are at risk, although they also have value when 
threatened by more insidious forces requiring strategic discipline and 
patience. This need for discretion applies as much to Zschernig during the 
Cold War as to Crosby in the struggle against current dictatorships, and even 
to Acuerdo Galicia-Dinamarca insofar as the integrity of national policy 
against environmental threats might be undercut by an independent policy of 
a sub-state entity to protect its own environment with the help of a foreign 
state. 
At the other extreme, the interests, indeed the duties, of all persons to 
protect their fundamental rights in solidarity with other members of their 
political communities and to international legal protection for this purpose 
includes, it seems to me, the right and the duty to participate in international 
society to protect these fundamental rights. These interests must be protected 
by means of reducing the level of governmental discretion, especially when 
142. According to José Luis MEILÁN GIL: "The experience and techniques of 
comparative law might be employed with respect to the particular experience of 
federal states, without undermining precipitously the constitutional design of the 
autonomic state. Some of the decisions that have been adopted are irreversible; others 
are not." See La Ordenación Jurídica de las Autonomías, 162 (1988)) ("El aprovecha-
miento de la experiencia y de las técnicas del derecho comparado, singularmente de 
los Estados federales, puede llevarse a cabo sin desnaturalizar precipitadamente el 
diseño constitucional del Estado autonómico. Algunas de las decisiones adoptadas son 
irreversibles, pero no todas"). 
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central governments monopolize the coercive powers of society and use those 
powers to defend their security interests by whatever means they may 
find convenient under the pressure of the moment. This need applies as 
much in Reid v. Covert, to protect the right to a civil trial of a civilian 
dependent accused of committing a criminal offense on the front lines, albeit 
fortuitously, of the Cold War, as in Oficina Vasca en Bruselas, to protect the 
interests of an autonomous community in standing guard over the potential 
evolution of the European Union so as to risk its limited rights to self-
government under the Spanish Constitution. 
The tension between, on the one hand, maximal discretion for the central 
state and, on the other, ensuring that the rule of law constrains that state's 
power to oppress, arguably requires different balances as to different subject 
matters at different moments in the lives of nations. The constitutions of 
complex states, such the United States and Spain, must retain the flexibility to 
take the necessary doctrinal turn at the necessary moment. This requires, 
rather than "systematic" interpretation, a series of cases that, as George 
Fletcher has suggested, may serve as a "source of experience, drama, and 
insight." The capacity to respond to the unforeseen requires these virtues 
rather than, however admirable they may be, the virtues of system and 
science. 
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